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ABSTRACT 
The pace of democratic political and economic reforms in Ukraine has been 
slower than that of some other democracies of post-communist Eastern and Central 
Europe. Ukraine is still uncertain of its future development orientation.  The reasons for 
this uncertainty involve internal factors such as the historically diverse political, cultural 
and ethnic affiliations of Ukraine’s population. At the same time, the impact of external 
factors, especially Russian and Western geo-strategic interests relating to the future of 
Ukraine, also contribute to the current crisis. 
The thesis examines the historically-based geopolitical and cultural attachments 
of the Ukrainian people in relation to the nation-formation process in independent 
Ukraine. The absence of a common national identity in Ukraine is one of the obstacles to 
successful national development. In the case of Ukraine, a sense of national identity 
cannot be based purely on ethno-cultural and regional bonds. On the contrary, the 
emphasis on the rise of civic consciousness among all strata of Ukrainian society seems 
crucial. The successful integration of major democratic values might afford a clear 
direction for the country’s future development, and help define its place in Europe in a 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. GENERAL HYPOTHESIS 
It is not easy for a state to establish democratic governance, popular sovereignty, 
political unity and a market economy while maintaining a good standard of living for its 
people.  The case of Ukraine illustrates the difficulties of such transitions.  The process of 
transformation has been slower in Ukraine compared with other democracies in the post-
communist space in Eastern and Central Europe. Why?  
Ukraine is uncertain of its future in Europe.  Reasons for uncertainty include 
internal factors like the historically diverse political, cultural and ethnic affiliations of 
Ukraine’s population. At the same time, one should not underestimate the influence of 
external factors, especially Russian and Western geo-strategic interests.  
Development of an independent Ukraine could be furthered by a strong common 
national identity, based not only on ethnic affiliation, but also on the values of democracy 
and a liberal market economy. The successful integration of such values might afford a 
clear direction for the country’s future development, and help define its place in Europe 
in a way that would be acceptable to a majority of the Ukrainian people. This thesis 
analyzes how the internal and external pressures arising from Ukraine’s history and 
geographical location may help or hinder the development of national identity.  It surveys 
the process of national identity formation and investigates how that process contributes to 
current uncertainties about Ukraine’s future. 
The primary questions to be answered in this research include:  
• How does the lack of national identity in Ukraine influence its 
development? 
• Why is there still no common national identity in Ukraine? 
• What is the likely vector of Ukraine’s national development?  
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research advances understanding of the historically-based geopolitical and 
cultural affiliations of the Ukrainian people and how this influences the nation-formation 
process in Ukraine. How Ukrainian society sees itself and the surrounding world is 
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heavily affected by the Soviet legacy. This thesis ventures some recommendations on 
how to overcome the obstacles to successful consolidation. A sense of national identity 
cannot be based purely on ethno-cultural and regional bonds. On the contrary, civic 
consciousness among all strata of Ukrainian society is crucial. 
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a significant social science literature focused on ethnic problems, the role 
of nationalist movements, and the influence of such movements on foreign policies in 
post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Well-known contributors to the 
field include scholars such as Ted Hopf, Paul D’Anieri, Robert Kravchuk, Taras Kuzio, 
Anthony Smith, Paul Magosci, Illya Prizel, Roman Szporluk, Mikhail Molchanov and 
Andrew Wilson.  Works by these authors are discussed below. Most relevant studies 
were written in the 1990s and acknowledge that the world order changed dramatically 
after the collapse of communism as a state ideology and the disappearance of a stable 
bipolar system. The authors discuss the inevitable emergence of a security vacuum in 
post-communist space. They see sparks of nationalism, along with uncertainty among 
political elites and the general population in newly emerged or re-emerged post-
communist countries, as indirect responses to the dissolution of the Soviet empire.  
In contrast, this thesis examines national identity and its relationship with, and 
influence on, further state development. The focus is specifically on integration processes 
in the context of Ukraine's choice of its place in the contemporary geopolitical space. 
The school of social constructivism focuses on the importance of various 
domestic influences.  This thesis considers different theoretical approaches that 
illuminate the nature and origins of state foreign policies. A hypothesis consistent with 
the social constructivist account is that the situation in contemporary Ukraine, with its 
unclear perception of itself and surrounding others, is due to two factors:  Ukraine's 
historical lack of a unified society and its very short period of statehood.  
The school of social constructivism provides valuable analytical tools for studying  
social identity, treating it as a complex entity that influences foreign policy choices. 
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Social constructivists like Ted Hopf believe that all societies consist of social structures.1 
Hopf argues that every individual in society has a whole spectrum of identities. Each 
identity has associated with it a collection of discursive practices, including, for example, 
a written or spoken language with a vocabulary, and characteristic physical behaviors, 
such as gestures, dress, customs, habits, and so on.2 Particular individual identities 
predominate in particular spheres of social life. Hopf’s main insight is that the complexity 
of numerous individual identities contributes to the creation and recreation of discourse 
and a “social cognitive structure” which creates boundaries for every society.  Although 
Hopf's Social Construction of International Politics, Identities and Foreign Policies, 
Moscow, 1995 and 1999 does not consider in detail such inextricable constituents of 
people’s identity as a sense of ethnic belonging or the origins of political and cultural 
affiliations, he nonetheless provides useful insights in this area. His analytical work 
focuses on recovering major social identities that evolved in Soviet and post-cold war 
Russia within existing social cognitive structures; he demonstrates how certain types of 
domestic identities could influence state policies. This assumption is relevant to the case 
discussed in this thesis, if one takes into account the immediate proximity of Ukraine to 
Russia and the persistent congruence of domestic discourse among large parts of the 
population, especially in the Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine. 
Domination of one or another type of discourse among political elites means 
different visions of state interests and different perceptions of others. These visions of 
state interests and perceptions of others shape domestic and foreign policies. 
Anthony D. Smith, in National Identity, provides a straightforward introduction to 
the nature, causes and consequences of national identity as a collective phenomenon. 
Smith identifies five fundamental features of national identity:  
• A historical territory or homeland  
• Common myths and historical memories 
• A common, mass public culture  
                                                 
1 Ted Hopf. Social Construction of International Politics, Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 
1995 and 1999. (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002), 1. 
2 Hopf, 2.  
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• Common legal rights and duties for all members of society 
• A common economy with territorial mobility for all members of society 3  
These features are examined in this thesis to determine which are absolutely 
crucial for Ukraine and which have remained underdeveloped.  
Smith provides interesting insights. For example, he states that the “nation” draws 
on elements of other kinds of collective identity, which explains how national identity 
can be combined with other types of identity, such as class, religious or ethnic identity,   
and also explains “the chameleon-like permutations of nationalism, the ideology, with 
other ideologies like liberalism, fascism and communism.”4  He argues that nations and 
nationalism cannot be understood simply as an ideology or form of politics; they must be 
treated as cultural phenomena as well.5 He emphasizes that national identity can oppose 
other kinds of collective cultural identifications, and that a national identity is 
fundamentally multidimensional and can never be reduced to a single element. Smith 
suggests that “national identity” and “the nation” are complex constructs composed of 
interrelated components—ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political. To 
understand the notion of the nation, conceptually, one must blend two important sets of 
dimensions, one civic and territorial, the other ethnic and genealogical, in varying 
proportions in particular cases.6  The difficulty is finding the balance between these 
dimensions.  It seems reasonable to consider the possibility of that this phenomenon is 
occurring in Ukraine.  
The school of Marxism-Leninism provided ideological guidance to Ukraine’s 
political elites for more than seventy years. The Communist Manifesto says, “The 
workers have no fatherland. They cannot lose what they do not have.”7 As everyone now 
                                                 
3 Anthony Smith. National Identity (Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 14. 
4 Smith’s assumptions seem applicable to the Ukrainian case. In Ukraine, the nationalist mood among 
those living in the western part of the country is matched by absolute indifference among those who have 
been more influenced by communist ideology in the eastern part of the country. 
5 Smith. 
6 Smith, 15. 
7 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party (New York: International 
Publishers, 1948), 156. 
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knows, utopia never arrived.  However, Soviet leaders from Lenin onward understood 
that nation-building in a country with an extremely diverse population could not be based 
only on a sense of belonging to a particular social class, and that historically formed 
ethnic, cultural and regional traits had to be taken into account. Numerous attempts were 
made to eradicate any self identification other than as part of the Soviet working class, 
the socialist peasantry or the Soviet intelligentsia. Nonetheless, Lenin and Stalin both 
acknowledged that complex and quite sophisticated ethnic, linguistic, and territorial 
policies were needed for Soviet “nation building.” Consequently, Stalinist policy was 
characterized by the imposition of historical origin myths to convey that segments of the 
population were “predestined” to unite as a single “Soviet nation.” This applies 
specifically to the western territories gained by the Soviets in 1939-45, including western 
Ukraine, Moldavia, the Baltic republics and western Belarus.  After 1939, when the 
western and eastern parts of Ukraine were united, Kremlin ideologists realized that if 
their “experiment” was to continue, it would have to be confined to clearly defined 
“democracy-proof” borders within which the masses could be subordinated to a 
totalitarian system.  Nonetheless, there was some state support for the development of 
numerous Soviet nationalities, although always under the strict control of the Communist 
Party to insure consistency with the Soviet framework.  
With regard to the Slavic republics of Ukraine and Belarus, the Russians were 
assigned an indisputable leading role in the “indivisible” Slavic fraternity. Soviet 
historiographers insisted that all three peoples originated from one ancestral polity, 
Kyivan Rus’, centered on what is today Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine.8  Although the 
argument can now be disputed, it is more important to understand which stages of 
Ukrainian history shaped its identity and the people’s common beliefs. 
Paul D’Anieri, in Politics and Society in Ukraine, mentions that since the Mongol 
invasion, along with a large territory under Moscow rule, considerable portions of 
Ukraine were included in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the subsequent 
Polish state, while the Crimea was controlled by the Crimean Tatar Khanate with close 
                                                 
8 Paul D’Anieri, Roman Kravchuk and Taras Kuzio, eds. Politics and Society in Ukraine. (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), 45. 
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ties to the Ottoman Empire. Despite frequent Cossack uprisings and wars for 
independence, most of the time Ukraine was divided between Russia and Poland.9 These 
two nations play a crucial role in shaping the Ukrainian people’s identity, historically and 
perhaps in the foreseeable future as well. In assessing these influences, Paul Magosci 
states:  
While Ukrainianism was being suppressed in the Russian Empire, all the 
fundamentals that make possible a viable national life – ideology, 
language, literature, cultural organization, education, religion and politics 
– were being formally established in the Austrian Empire [where Poland 
while being a part of it had a determining influence on the western part of 
Ukraine].10  
Because of the historical presence of the attributes of nationhood in Western 
Ukraine, and the lack of these attributes in its other parts, Magosci implies that a clear 
division between western and eastern areas should be visible in contemporary Ukraine as 
well.  
In addition, a review of different academic approaches reveals that national 
identity, as a cultural phenomenon, is widely considered in association with ideological 
nationalism as a political program. Despite the abundant literature on nationalism in 
Eastern Europe, the relationship between the formation of a common national identity in 
Ukraine and the absence of clear direction of national development has not been studied 
in depth.  
D.  FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
The thesis investigates the relationship between the slow process of forming a 
Ukrainian national identity and the frequently changing domestic and foreign policies 
pursued by the Ukrainian political elites. In light of the hypothesis that challenges to the 
consolidation of a national identity in Ukraine have deep historical roots and are 
inextricably linked with the successes and failures of state development since 1991, 
Chapter II focuses on the concept of national identity and discusses which of its 
necessary features are lacking or remain underdeveloped, and why.    
                                                 
9 D'Anieri, Kravchuk and Kuzio. 
10 Paul R. Magosci. A History of Ukraine (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), 456. 
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The thesis defines a basic set of variables relevant to Ukrainian national identity 
and national development. The independent, dependent and intervening variables 
considered by this model include the following: 
Independent Variables   
• Geographic location of Ukraine between the East and the West  
• Ukraine's complex ethnic composition  
• The historical lack of national statehood  
• Different cultural, linguistic, religious and geopolitical attachments in 
different regions  
Dependent Variables   
• The process of national consolidation  
• National consciousness and a common vision of national development 
among the Ukrainian people  
• The major orientation of Ukraine’s national development, which might 
include  multidimensional integration with the West or deepening 
relationships with institutions of Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) and increasing political, economic and socio-cultural dependence on 
Russia 
Intervening Variables 
• Domestic and foreign policies pursued by Ukrainian political elites 
• External influences on national development at various  levels 
(international institutions, national governments, interactions between 
ordinary people and foreigners that shape Ukrainians' self-identification 
and perception of others) 
These variables are investigated to clarify which are most important for Ukrainian 
national development and to test the importance of consolidated civil society versus 
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II. THE CREATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY: 
MYTHS AND REALITIES 
A. THE LINK BETWEEN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND STATE 
DEVELOPMENT 
National identity is a complex phenomenon that must be studied from different 
angles. There are a large number of publications on national identity and it is surprising 
to find a great deal of confusion in terminology and disagreements about the origins and 
nature of nations. Guntram Herb, a scholar of nationalism, notes that “as a result of the 
blurred distinction between civic identities and ethnic nations, it is a common practice to 
use nation and state as synonyms, despite the significant differences between them.”11 
For example, international relations refers to relations between states; the United Nations 
represents the states of the world rather than national groups. The notion of nationalism is 
related to an ideology that seeks to make a population identify with the institutions of the 
state, even though “patriotism” would be a more appropriate term.12  
Two general trends can be identified in studies of national identity, nationalism, 
and nations: the primordialist and constructivist approaches. The former argues that 
nations are organically grown entities, which it is impossible to construct or artificially 
create, and the whole world is inevitably and fatally divided into nations. It holds that 
nations are based on distinctive national spirits or essences and should be seen as 
“collective answers to the call of blood [that are] the only true organic group identities 
and crucial for the survival of the planet because these nations have evolved through a 
harmonious relationship with the local environment.”13 According to this view, pre-
modern identities were mostly products of historical ethnogenesis,14 which can be traced 
                                                 
11 Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan, eds. Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale. 
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 13. 
12 Herb and Kaplan, 13. 
13 Herb and Kaplan, 14. 
14 Taras Kuzio discusses the primordialist account which considers nations in the context of 
ethnogenetic or “ethnicist” conceptions based on the assumption that “ethnos” is a generative phenomenon 
for any stage of a civilization's development.  Taras Kuzio and Paul D’Anieri, eds. Dilemmas of State-led 
Nation Building in Ukraine. (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), 30-35. 
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as ethnicities or nations far into the pre-modern era.  The ethnogenetic account of nation 
formation generally does not acknowledge that a nation may be constructed or invented; 
therefore it cannot be formed except in a natural way. This author tends to agree that 
nation-formation is a process, not an occurrence.  
Another major trend, the constructivist approach, considers nations as mostly 
artificial creations founded on myths of common historical origins and memories. An 
extreme assumption of this camp is that belonging to an ethnic group is often a matter of 
attitudes, perceptions and sentiments that are necessarily fleeting and mutable. In the 
words of Anthony Smith, this “makes it possible for ethnicity to be used ‘instrumentally’ 
to further individual or collective interests, particularly of competing elites who need to 
mobilize large populations to support their goals in the struggle for power.”15  
According to this view, nations have four major characteristics. They are:  “1) the 
product[s] of structural change; 2) the product[s] of a discourse of domination; 3) the 
project of elites; and 4) a bounded community of exclusion and opposition.”16 
Constructivists seeing nations as products of structural change also argue that 
modernization, industrialization and the blossoming of capitalism gradually changed 
ancient, isolated communities. They became societies where emerging elites played a 
significant role in the transformation of loyalty to tradition-based communities with a 
sense of membership in larger social structures.17 Literacy-based abstract cultures 
replaced traditional communal bonds and facilitated solidarity among larger groups of 
people who tended to realize own distinctiveness also through the construction of 
outsiders as the “Other.”  
Some authors define nations as communities in juxtaposition to some other 
groups and focus on the importance of their boundaries. Daniele Conversi, for example, 
says, “the tendency of nations to stress antagonisms against other groups is dependent on 
the strength of their internal cultural content.”18  
                                                 
15 Smith, 20. 
16 Smith. 
17 Herb, 14. 
18 Herb, 15. 
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In accordance with the constructivist argument, it is important to point out that 
these boundaries are always in flux. National identity is not a constant and can change 
dramatically over time with changes in internal conditions and external influences.   
Despite the differences in the explanatory models, some helpful generalizations 
are possible; neither the primordialist nor the constructivist position should be rejected or 
taken for granted. The generalizations include the following.  
• A nation evokes stronger loyalty from its members than do other 
communities. The sense of belonging can be interpreted as having evolved 
over time, whether as an organic phenomenon or as an artificially created 
construction. Collective identity is not static but influenced by prevailing 
discursive processes. 
• Historical memories, which can be based on actual historical events or 
relevant myths, are important for strengthening national identity.  
• Territory is vital to national belonging. The geographical location of the 
territory, with its specific historical legacy and the neighbors that affect it, 
is important in defining national identity. 
This author believes that the problems of nation-building are tightly intertwined 
with the process of state-building. Some nations form gradually, through a long historical 
process, with the state emerging later as the ultimate legitimate authority over ethnic 
groups willing to unite in a single political, economic and cultural space. In such cases, 
the nation-state is the final product of a process that provides general guidance and 
protection to people who live in the same territory and share the same or similar origins. 
There unlikely might be clearly defined periods or stages when the process of nation 
formation ends and  state building begins, since the two processes are interlinked and 
often overlap in time and space. Western European countries like France, England, or 
Italy serve as examples. The emergence of these separate nation-states was preceded by a 
long process in which the distinctive national consciousness of each was formed through 
multiple ethnic, religious and territorial conflicts for ethnic dominance within particular 
territories. Of course, the situation has changed dramatically since the first modern 
nation-states emerged in Europe and put an end to the feudal age. And in other cases, 
state formation preceded the stage of active national consolidation. The United States is a 
good example of this sort of historical development.  
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In the contemporary world, as liberal democratic ideals are gradually accepted by 
more and more countries, national consolidation processes, especially in Eastern Europe, 
are rarely associated with bloody ethno-nationalist wars for dominance or the claim to be 
“the highest race.” With exceptions (the fierce ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia), 
the general trend in newly emerged or re-emerged countries is acceptance of basic 
principles of pluralistic civil societies as common norms. The pace of this process varies, 
as domestic and external factors galvanize or hamper national consolidation.  
Contemporary Ukraine represents quite a complicated situation. What are the 
major characteristics for self-identification? What really serves as the basis for state and 
nation building in Ukraine?  
The factors that national identity could depend on include those proposed by both 
Kuzio and Smith.19 They take similar approaches to defining nations, arguing that 
national identity should be understood through the same factors as nations to include: 
• shared historical memory and common ancestry  
• shared religion 
• common language 
• a sense of political community 
• a demarcated bounded space with which the citizens feel they belong (the 
“homeland”) 
• a single code of rights and duties 
• a common economy with territorial mobility for members of society 
• common mass public culture 
• common institutions 
This wide range of factors seems plausible and relevant if one considers a 
particular case. However, it is not easy to determine which factors are most important for 
a sense of common national identity among the population of a country with clearly 
defined and internationally recognized borders. This is not to say that a sense of common 
national identity cannot be developed without a state. Some peoples, for instance Kurds, 
have managed to develop and preserve a distinctive feeling of unity. While they have 
                                                 
19 See D’Anieri and Kuzio, 12-15.  
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never rejected the idea of their own nation state, for centuries they have been divided, 
living on the territories of multiple adjacent states. This proves that for some peoples, the 
control of the territory they live in is not crucial for self-identification. 
In order to assess the case of Ukraine, which today has all the attributes of 
independent statehood but at the same time remains in limbo, the dependent, 
independent, and intervening variables discussed in Chapter I are used to explore the real 
causes of slow national development and how this might be affected if some variables 
were to change.  
A brief analysis of some interpretations of the history of the Ukrainian people, 
beginning with the Middle Ages, illustrates which factors are most important for 
successful nation-building in Ukraine and which are relevant but to a lesser degree.  
Considering Ukraine’s ethnic composition reveals whether it might, within existing 
borders, develop some kind of overarching identity based purely on ethno-nationalistic 
ideas. In other words, can Ukraine consolidate its people (which this author considers a 
necessary precondition for successful state and nation development) along ethnic lines? 
It is fair to assume that the state was formed before the nation. It is not that the 
distinctive Ukrainian “ethnie” was nonexistent before 1991.20  However, the 
contemporary notion of a nation in most cases involves a civic and pluralistic polity built 
on liberal democratic principles. A conscious choice in favor of a democratic future was 
made by a majority of the Ukrainian people when Ukraine became independent. 
Fortunately Ukraine, unlike Russia, does not show signs of growing authoritarianism. 
Examination of the period between 1991 and 2006 reveals which domestic and 
external influences play positive and negative roles in national consolidation and might 
shape the future of national development. Finally, to place Ukraine in historical context 
and reveal the importance of a common historical memory, the chapter discusses the 
ongoing debate over rights for those of Kyivan Rus' ancestry. 
                                                 
20 The term “ethnie” is used by Smith to identify premodern precursors of modern nations. 
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B. KYIVAN RUS’: WHO ARE ITS SUCCESSORS? CONTESTING 
NATIONAL ORIGINS IN THE SEARCH FOR A NATION’S 
CONTINUITY 
The search for a distinct Ukrainian ethnie or people, with ancient historical roots, 
has engaged domestic politicians, academicians and ordinary citizens. This indicates that 
historical continuity is a factor defining national identity and relevant to national 
consolidation.  
The years since Ukraine gained its independence from the dissolving Soviet state 
have seen a number of disparate interpretations of local history. During the communist 
period, because historiographers were simply not allowed to disagree with the Party-
imposed Soviet interpretation, the dominant understanding of the historical origins of all 
Slavic people remained uncontested. The Communist historiographers stated that three 
East Slavic peoples, the Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians, descended from a single 
ancestor, Kyivan Rus’.  This was seen as the first state formation that was put together by 
the equal participation of the East Slavic tribes that lived in the river Dnipro basin 
between the 7th and 9th centuries.  
In the mid-twelfth century, Kyivan Rus’ extended from the Carpathian Mountains 
and the Black Sea in the southwest to the White Sea in the northeast, thus including about 
two-thirds of what later became Ukraine and most of present-day Belarus. The ethnic 
Russian heartland of contemporary Vladimir, Pskov, Suzdal, Novgorod, Tver, Smolensk, 
Riazan’ and some other regions of central Russia were also part of the empire ruled by 
great princes of Kyiv. It is known that the political organization and culture of the early 
Rus’ were formed in interaction with a number of neighboring peoples, of which the 
Scandinavians (Varangians) and Turkic tribes (Pechenegs and Khazars) were among the 
most influential.  
Some chronicles provide evidence that the most celebrated dynasty of the Kyivan 
Rus’ was begun by the Varangian warrior Riurik, but circumstances surrounding this 
event spawned controversy about the origins of East Slavic statehood. While the so-
called Normanist school of historians denied the local population any role in state making 
and argued the Norse origins of the word “Rus,” the anti-Normanist tradition, begun by 
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Mikhail Lomonosov and the 19th century Russian historians, views Scandinavian 
involvement in the Old Rus politics as secondary and dependent on the choices made by 
the indigenous elite. However, some relatively new analyses show that the name “Rus’” 
and “Ros’” appear in sources that predate the northerners’ arrival by several hundred 
years.21  
In independent Ukraine, with the discrediting of the Soviet Marxism paradigm, 
numerous new studies of Ukrainian history appeared at first.  Most present a mix of 
Soviet categories and previously suppressed classical Ukrainian national historiography, 
and infuse these with Western social science theories and historiography. The latter 
became popular in the newly found openness of the Ukrainian academies, which had 
been thoroughly infiltrated by the secret police in the years before independence.  
Ukraine clearly demonstrates the difficulties in finding continuous historical 
memories, a problem that also applies to European countries like Slovakia, Poland and 
Romania. European national histories show that states have not always been continuous, 
administrative boundaries change frequently and peoples have been intermingled. 
However, the situation in those countries differs significantly from the Ukrainian case. In 
these other countries, the dominance of the ethnic groups around which national 
consolidation occurred did not encounter serious rivalry from other local ethnic 
minorities. Andrew Wilson, in The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation clearly demonstrates 
the long evolution of the Ukrainian people with all its discontinuities and paths not 
taken.22  
Because one factor considered important in defining national identity is shared 
historical memory and recognition of common ancestry, it is appropriate to discuss the 
ongoing conflict between Ukrainian and Russian historiographers over the historical roots 
of these two peoples.  Kyivan Rus’, believed to be the first state formation of Eastern 
Slavs, has been a subject of severe disagreements among historians, who dispute the 
                                                 
21 Mikhail A Molchanov, Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations 
(College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 60. 
22 Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, 2nd edition. (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2002). 
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actual identity of the Rus’. Linguistic imprecision and, unfortunately, Soviet Russo-
centrism led to the assumption that the Rus’ were simply early medieval Russians, an 
assumption that denies Ukrainians and Belarusians any separate identity. However, Rus’ 
most likely preceded the appearance of all three Eastern Slavic peoples, at a time when 
collective identities were extremely loose and modern nations did not exist.  
Why does any of this matter? One answer can be found by examining a current 
discourse that is widespread in Russia and quite harmful to Ukraine and especially to the 
populations along the Ukraine-Russian border. The practical impact of the discourse is 
that Russians are still raised with the idea of a single ancient Rus’ or Russian nation and 
manifest great difficulty or unwillingness to accept Ukrainians’ separate origin as a 
people, not to mention the fact of a separate Ukrainian state. These sentiments can be 
found in overtly anti-Ukrainian propaganda campaigns conducted by some Russian 
media outlets and think tanks, purportedly independent but obviously sponsored by the 
Kremlin. Suffice it to say that half a billion rubles were secured in Russia’s budget in 
2006 for spreading “Russian-style” visions of the past and future of the huge territory of 
the CIS through a network of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to be established 
for this purpose.23  
As a result of these Russian interpretations, Ukrainian historians often swing to 
the opposite extreme, claiming the unity of Rus’ as their own—claiming, in other words, 
that Rus’ was Kyivan and therefore a Ukrainian state, and seeking to deny Russians their 
traditional theory of national origin.24 Neither approach is likely to explain the history 
since the Kyivan Rus, and neither is based on clear and undeniable evidence from reliable 
written sources, and therefore the ongoing contest between Ukraine and Russia over their 
respective ancestry has little purpose for Ukraine. However, it really does make sense in 
Russia, where perception of the historic greatness of the Russian people is a good fuel for 
social mobilization and national consolidation. Historians and other intellectuals’ 
arguments and pseudo-evidence are widely used in political circles to advance Russian 
                                                 
23 See Marek Menkiszak, “The Russian Idea of ‘Great Europe’ vs. the European Neighborhood 
Policy” Center for European Studies. (http://www.csis.org/), accessed 2 December 2006. 
24 Wilson, 2. 
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neo-imperial ambitious and their influence in the border regions. As a result, there is a 
growing distance between the populations of the eastern and western parts of Ukraine, 
which significantly hampers national consolidation. 
To summarize, for any contemporary nation, it is quite important to have common 
historical memories and myths that can serve as a unifying factor for the people. 
Ukraine’s attempt to proclaim its nation as an “historic” one while using arguments based 
on ethno-nationalistic views produces contradictory results, like the deepening divide 
between the Russified east which sees its own history, and especially the period of 
Kyivan Rus’, tightly linked to Russia’s, and the Ukrainian west, where distinctive 
national consciousness has been much stronger and the vision of history quite different.  
C. THE COMPLEX ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF UKRAINE: THE 
SECRETS OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE 
Ukrainian ethnic composition is one of the independent variables in the applied 
analytical framework. The peculiarity of the national structure of Ukraine's population is 
its multi-ethnic composition. According to All-Ukrainian population census data, more 
than 130 nationalities and ethnic groups live in Ukrainian territory. Some figures 
highlight the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of these groups. 
According to the most recent census, as of 2001 the population was 48,457,000.25 
Of this total, 77.8 percent, or 37,541,700 people, were registered as ethnic Ukrainians. 
Russians constituted the largest minority with 8,334,100 residents, or 17.3 percent of the 
population.26 The remaining 2,581,200 people, or 4.9 percent of the population, 
comprised 128 different ethnic groups.  Some of the most numerous include Jews, Tatars, 
Poles, Belarusians, Greeks, Romanians, Moldovans. Another important fact revealed by 
the census is that some 5.5 million ethnic Ukrainians claimed Russian as their native 
language and were considered partly or entirely Russified. In addition, 85.2 percent of  
 
 
                                                 
25 Unless otherwise noted, all data are from the official web site of State Statistic Committee of 
Ukraine, (http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua) accessed 5 January 2007. 
26 In comparison with the 1989 census, the number of ethnic Russians in 2001 was three million less, 
dropping from 22.1 to 17.3 percent of the total population. 
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Ukrainian ethnics were exclusively Ukrainian speakers, while 95.9 percent of Russian 
ethnics declared Russian as their first or exclusive language (3 percent less than in the 
1989 census). 
About the same number of marriages in Ukraine were identified as mixed both by 
the 1989 and 2001 censuses (20 percent) but with one distinctive characteristic: in 1989 
most offspring of mixed marriages identified themselves as Russian, whereas in 2001 the 
majority of young people from mixed marriages considered themselves Ukrainians.  
Taking into account obvious changes between 1989 and 2001, it is hard to claim 
that even simple membership in an ethnic group can be considered a steady characteristic 
of any individual or group of people. It is not something that should be taken for granted, 
especially considering ethnicities such as Russians and Ukrainians, with their closely 
intertwined pasts. The large number of ethnically mixed families makes it possible to 
conclude that between two extremes—clearly distinctive groups of people like ethnic 
Russians of the Crimean Peninsula and western Ukrainians of the Galicia region—there 
is a third category of people with blurred identities and an extremely weak sense of 
distinctive cultural, linguistic and political belonging. The eastern Ukrainian regions of 
Donbas and Luhansk, which are mostly populated by this category of people, are poorly 
understood by outsiders and sometimes deliberately misinterpreted by Ukrainian 
nationalists. Although they show no strongly expressed popular commitment to 
Ukrainian statehood and independence, nor do they demonstrate a clearly developed 
sense of national identity, it is too simplistic to characterize the majority of inhabitants as 
secessionists or seeking reintegration into Russia or the CIS.27  
The Kremlin has sponsored a massive campaign to mobilize Russian minorities in 
the region in an attempt to increase its influence on public opinion and achieve Russia’s 
geopolitical goals, but the people do not have strong loyalty toward Moscow and are  
 
 
                                                 
27 Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zviglyanich, eds. Ukraine. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 171. 
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reportedly not attracted to the nationalist movements in Russia.28 Indeed, this population 
exhibits a tangible regional identity that is neither monoethnic nor multiethnic but rather 
a “de-ethnified” identity with Russian as the major language.29 People in eastern 
Ukrainian regions like Donbas, Luhansk and Dnipropertovsk view themselves 
simultaneously as Ukrainian, Russian and Slavic, but for them the regional focus takes 
priority. 
A key characteristic which explains the absence of serious ethnic conflicts in 
Ukraine is that this “transitional identity” predefines national allegiance on the basis of 
local economic self-interest rather than ethnonationalist commitment, particularly after 
the collapse of Communism. To a large degree the policies toward ethnic minorities 
pursued by Ukrainian political elites since independence have prevented negative 
developments. One important step, for example, in respect to the language policy, 
appears in Article 10 of the 1996 Ukrainian Constitution. 
The state language in Ukraine is the Ukrainian language. The state 
guarantees the all-around development and functioning of the Ukrainian 
language in all spheres of social life on the territory of Ukraine. In Ukraine 
the free development, use and protection of Russian, other languages of 
national minorities of Ukraine is guaranteed. The state promotes the study 
of languages of international communication.30 
This suggests a balanced approach, incorporating the ideas of Ukrainophone 
nationalistic thinking while not diminishing the rights of the Russian-speaking 
population. In practice, however, the language issue remains the subject of agitation by 
pro-Russian political forces and always emerges during the periods of parliamentary and 
local elections.  
                                                 
28 Wolchik and Zviglyanych describe this campaign as a means to push the Ukrainian authorities into 
defining the state along ethnic grounds, and to provoke alienation of the large segment of Russian-speakers. 
The Russophone lobby has attempted to manipulate ethnic and linguistic distinctions and has raised the 
specter of forceful Ukrainization to increase popular fears, mobilize public opinion behind their policies 
and increase opposition to Kyiv. 
29 Wolchik and Zviglyanich, 171. 
30 Adapted from the English language version of the Ukrainian constitution. 
(http://www.rada.gov.ua/const/conengl.htm#r2) accessed 16 January 2007. 
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Concerning the choice of language, most people in eastern and southern regions 
use Russian as their first language. Numerous attempts by center-left political activists to 
gain political capital on language issues, even requiring that Russian be designated the 
second state language, have not noticeably affected the attitudes of westerners and 
easterners toward each other. The sphere of Russian usage had not grown smaller, and 
Russian speakers retain all opportunities to exercise traditional cultural rights. However, 
the pro-Russian and left parties have frightened the electorate in the east and south with 
the threat of impending “Ukrainization.” On the other side, western scholars who 
implicitly support the idea of “nationalizing Ukraine” along ethnic lines bitterly criticized 
the Ukrainian government under President Kuchma for its unclear policy of 
multivectorism.31 Kuzio was among the critics; he emphasized his negative impression of 
Kuchma’s policy by saying, that Kuchma 
pays lip-service to both communist and nationalist symbols, flirts with 
both Russophone and Ukrainophone leaders, sends mixed messages, and 
deliberately contributes to the total confusion, aptly called a “social 
schizophrenia”…There is no coherent, consistent cultural policy in 
Ukraine that could be interpreted as either radical deSovietization, 
decommunization, or decolonization (unlike in the Baltic, Central, and 
Eastern European states) or a further Sovietization and colonization-
creolization (like in Belarus). Ukraine remains stuck between these two 
models …The confusing eclecticism of Ukrainian life and Ukrainian 
cultural (and any other) politics results from the ambivalent nature of 
Ukrainian society, which is divided along regional, ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic, religious, generational, and many other lines.32 
The situation he depicts changed dramatically during the 2004 presidential 
elections when pro-Kuchma candidate Viktor Yanukovich, armed with an extensive staff 
of Russian “political technologists,” allegedly attempted to falsify the results of the  
 
                                                 
31 Multivectorism is the term widely used to characterize the official foreign policy pursued by the 
former President Kuchma’s administration. The policy resulted in a significant rapprochement with Russia 
in all spheres of political, economic and cultural life. At the same time the idea of Euro-Atlantic integration 
was also a part of the official political discourse. This incoherent position of the Ukrainian political elite 
did not allow them to conduct necessary reforms and hampered national development in Ukraine. 
32 D’Anieri and Kuzio, 52. 
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elections, which were consequently declared illegitimate.33 The run-off election revote, 
called for by the Ukrainian Supreme Court due to wide-spread election fraud in favor of 
the governmental candidate, was convincingly won by Viktor Yushchenko by a margin 
of 52 to 44 percent.34 Election fraud prompted public protests by millions of people and 
played a major role in that election; the term Orange Revolution, which Yushchenko was 
seen as leading, was applied interchangeably to the protests and to the election itself. 
November and December 2004 was characterized by the awakening of Ukrainian civil 
society which, for the first time since independence, demonstrated its resolve to no longer 
be politically manipulated by old-regime political forces. The results of the 2006 
parliamentary elections, in which Viktor Yanukovich’s pro-Russian political party won a 
majority of seats in Verkhovna Rada, shows significant support from the eastern and 
southern regions of Ukraine. The Yuschenko administration appears incapable of 
consolidating divergent political forces under the banner of the European model of 
national development, mostly because of its incoherent economic policies and diverse 
visions of Ukrainian foreign policy. However, the main achievement of the Orange 
Revolution remains. The Ukrainian people have become aware that their political will 
matters and that nothing can be achieved without joint efforts by ordinary citizens. That 
the citizens of Ukraine have been able to use normal democratic means to voice their 
preferences is no small part due to the state’s inclusive citizenship policy and the absence 




                                                 
33 The concept of “political technology” is one of the more sinister recent developments to come out 
of Vladimir Putin’s Russia. “Political technologists” have become one of the fastest growing new 
professions in Russia. More than mere spin doctors or propagandists, political technologists use every 
means at their disposal – fair or foul, no holds barred – to achieve the political results demanded by their 
political masters. See Robert Amsterdam: “A Russian ’Political Technologist’ Weighs in on the Arrest of 
Khodkorkovsky’s Lawyers” 
(http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2007/02/a_russian_political_technologi.htm) accessed 17 January 2007.  
34 Data available on the official web site of the Ukrainian Central Election Commission.  
(http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011) assessed 26 January 2007. 
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voter preferences would be important in determining how far a real or 
imagined nationalizing agenda can be pursued. This is not to rule out the 
possibility of ethnic conflict in Ukraine, but if Ukrainians continue on the 
path of democratic reform, the likelihood that differences will continue to 
be dealt with through the democratic process remains high.35  
D. REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN UKRAINE: TWO “POLES” OF MUTUAL 
MISUNDERSTANDING? 
Beside the problem of state language, interethnic relations in Ukraine are 
negatively affected by an ad hoc dispute related to the federalization of Ukraine. Such 
ideas, again, are mostly generated by the center-left, the Communists and the so-called 
Progressive Socialists who advocate decentralization with more pronounced regional 
autonomy, especially in regards to the economies of the eastern and southern regions. It is 
not hard to understand what is behind attempts to weaken the subtle civic consensus 
among the 130 ethnic groups which is crucial for peace and security in the region. 
Several eastern and southern regions, particularly Crimea and Donbas, are fully 
empowered and have wide-ranging political autonomy granted by the Constitution, so the 
advocacy of more regional autonomy reflects attempts by local elites, partly inspired by 
the Kremlin, to expand their own control at the expense of national unity, a campaign 
camouflaged by the concept of federalization. This factor undoubtedly serves as an 
obstacle to national consolidation. The unilateralist-federalist dispute continues to spread 
negative mutual perceptions between Ukraine's westerners and easterners.  Western 
Ukrainians tend to believe that easterners lack a national identity and value material 
conditions instead of state sovereignty and national integrity. In this view, if given the 
opportunity for a good life, easterners would betray Ukrainian independent statehood. 
This idea is widely accepted, despite the fact that in the 1991 referendum, 90.3 percent of 
the public voted for independence, including those in the most Russified eastern and 
southern parts of Ukraine.  
 
 
                                                 
35 D’Anieri and Kuzio, 97. 
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This western opinion seems reasonable in some respects. The east and south of 
Ukraine are indeed considerably Russified (both linguistically and because of Russia’s 
explicit and implicit intrusive policies toward bordering regions) so it will take a long 
time to construct a common Ukrainian national identity.  
On the other hand, easterners have widespread suspicions concerning the 
intentions of westerners. After independence, there was a pervasive belief that western 
Ukraine wanted national development only through forced Ukrainization, meaning state 
policies to base a new ethnonational identity on purely west Ukrainian principles. 
Although this trend was evident under President Kravchuk (1991-1994), his successor’s 
administration deemphasized Ukrainization. To strengthen the state’s civic orientation, 
the authorities introduced enlightened legislation furthering nondiscrimination toward 
ethnic minorities. The 1996 Ukrainian constitution codified opportunities for cultural 
development and political participation for national minorities.  The constitution 
confirmed the right of all citizens to preserve and protect their ethnic, cultural, linguistic 
and religious affiliations (Article 11) and to equality before the law regardless of 
nationality, language, religion, or race (Article 24); it also specified a host of civil, 
political, economic, and cultural rights. It stressed the creation of a civil society based on 
equal rights, self-organization, and self-government, while avoiding any overt focus on 
ethnicity.36  This shows that government policy since the mid 1990s emphasizes the civic 
direction of national and state development.  
Despite severe foreign policy disagreements between Yuschenko’s administration 
and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine headed by Yanukovich, there have been no 
significant changes in governmental policies toward ethnic groups, but it is another thing  





                                                 
36 See the Ukrainian constitution. 
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E. PERSPECTIVES ON UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM  
Ukrainian nationalism is rooted in centuries-old events that divided Ukraine 
among the Hapsburg Empire, Poland and Russia.37 To understand recent developments 
and the nationalist movements, Ukrainian nationalist agendas, both domestic and foreign, 
must be examined.  
1.  Major Aspects of Nationalist Discourse on Domestic and Foreign 
Issues  
A key question for nationalists is whether Ukraine should be the state of the 
“Ukrainian people”—of ethnic Ukrainians alone—or of the “people of Ukraine”—of all 
Ukraine’s inhabitants whatever their ethnic origin. Ukraine is not the only Soviet 
successor state looking to balance the rights of the titular nationality and those of the rest 
of population, but in Ukraine the dilemma is particularly acute. Compared with other 
post-Soviet states, only Belarus suffered a greater degree of Russification. Nationalists 
argue that Russification should be reversed by positive discrimination in favor of the 
indigenous population.  
It is noteworthy that the majority of Ukrainian nationalists stress adherence to the 
principles of a liberal and civic state. For example, in 1992 the major Ukrainian 
nationalist movement since the late 1980s, Rukh, admitted that for historical, ethnic, 
economic, political and socio-psychological reasons, Ukrainian society is not 
homogenous .38 Therefore, they say, “Rukh views Ukraine as a multinational state 
[formed] from the multinational nature of Ukrainian society.”39 Similarly, a Republican 
Party leader has argued that  
 
                                                 
37 The complexities of Ukrainian history are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
38 Rukh (in English, “Movement”) is a popular civic movement founded in 1989 with the introduction 
of Gorbachev’s policy of Glasnost. The major goal of Rukh was to establish an independent democratic 
Ukrainian State. Soon afterwards Rukh was transformed into an influential political party with a 
considerable base of popular support. The party’s proclaimed goal was to act as an instrument of the people 
in the drive for national independence and the rebirth of a Ukrainian national identity. Rukh became 
instrumental in the building of an open society in Ukraine, while also calling for the immediate dismantling 
of all vestiges of the Soviet totalitarian system.  Detailed information can be obtained on Rukh’s official 
website (http://www.nru.org.ua).  
39 Konseptsiia derzhavotvorennia v Ukraїni (Kyiv: Rukh, 1992), 4-5. 
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the most integrating factor in building a new Ukrainian state will be 
‘territorial patriotism,’ that is a sense of solidarity between all inhabitants 
of Ukrainian lands regardless of their social status, religious affiliation, 
ethnic origin or even national-cultural consciousness.40   
The national referendum on independence conducted on December 1, 1991, 
shows that the majority of voters in Ukraine supported independence because they 
believed that an existence separate from the Soviet Union might be the best guarantee of 
their economic well-being. Most Ukrainian political elites who campaigned in favor of 
independence “did not do so in the name of ethnic Ukrainian nationalism, but in the name 
of potential economic advancement.”41 Because Ukrainian politicians, including 
outspoken nationalists like Rukh leader V’iacheslav Chornovil, did not embrace an ethnic 
exclusivist platform, it was much easier for 11 million ethnic Russians in Ukraine to 
support independence. Again, to a large degree, they did so expecting economic benefits. 
Actually, there was widespread agreement among the people in Ukraine and also in 
Russia that the independence path would relieve the economic burdens imposed by the 
USSR central authorities on the Union Republics.  
One might argue that nationalist moderation on this important issue has been a 
key factor in helping independent Ukraine establish itself as a modern civic polity with 
liberal citizenship and language laws in marked contrast to the more restrictive approach 
of countries like Latvia or Estonia. Formal public policy on the nationality issue of all 
Ukrainian governments since 1991 is undoubtedly more liberal than in the above-
mentioned Baltic States.  
However, the true picture is rather more complex. On closer examination, the 
structure of the Ukrainian nationalist argument on nationhood, citizenship and ethnic 
rights is not much different from that of their Baltic counterparts. Some Ukrainian 
nationalists even deny that Ukraine is a multinational state.  
                                                 
40 Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s, a Minority Faith  (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 148. 
41 Astrid S. Tuminez, “Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union,” Journal 
of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, Number 4 (Fall 2003), 114. 
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Wilson identifies three major concepts of contemporary Ukrainian nationalism, 
drawing a parallel with nationalism in the Baltic States and other forms of ethno-
nationalism. These concepts are, first, “homeland” and the special rights of indigenous 
people, second, the right to cultural self-preservation, and third (to a much lesser extent) 
the notion of forced incorporation into the Soviet state and the illegitimacy of subsequent 
changes to national demographics and language use patterns.42  
The first, the claim to indigenousness, is a common feature of nationalist 
movements that emphasize an association with a specific homeland or historic territory. 
According to Ukrainian nationalists, 
Only states on whose territory different peoples have lived since time 
immemorial can be considered multinational (such as India or the Russian 
Federation). On the bulk of its territory Ukraine is mononational, because 
only one people has lived here since time immemorial – the Ukrainian (in 
Crimea – Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar). Other peoples arrived later, at 
different times and for different reasons, having left their ethnic 
fatherland.43  
In addition, most nationalists agree that Ukraine, as the state of the indigenous 
Ukrainian nation, is at the same time the state of the Ukrainian political nation, that is, of 
all citizens regardless of their nationality.44 It is clear that on this issue, the nationalist 
discourse cannot be considered very ambitious.  
A second common theme in Ukrainian and Baltic nationalist discourses refers to 
the right to cultural self-preservation, mostly based on the fact that centuries of Russian 
and Soviet domination have nearly destroyed the distinctive Ukrainian ethnos, leaving its 
very existence in doubt.45 Ukrainian nationalists also frequently claim that their own 
nation’s sufferings are historically unparalleled. Evidence of this discourse is available if 
one just recalls the millions of victims of the 1932-33 Great Famine, when Stalin forced 
collectivization in Ukraine. That tragedy was officially recognized recently as “genocide 
                                                 
42 Wilson, 150; see also Smith, 126. 
43 “Zaiava tsentral’nogo pravlinnia vseukrains’kogo tovarystva ‘Prosvita’ im. T.Shevchenka,” 
Literaturna Ukraina, (July 1999). 
44 Wilson, 151. 
45 Wilson, 151. 
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against the people of Ukraine” with legislation passed by the parliament.46 Furthermore, 
it is hard to dispute the Ukrainian nationalist claim that three centuries of Russian rule 
have been a demographic catastrophe for Ukraine.  
The third concept which Ukrainian nationalists share with many Baltic 
nationalists is the idea of forcible incorporation. Most nationalists believe that the 
Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), which emerged in 1917 and lasted only three years, 
was overthrown because “Russian chauvinist Bolshevism unleashed a war of conquest 
against the young Ukrainian state.” Blaming Bolshevism rather than internal weakness, 
they referred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic before 1991 as an “occupying 
administration.”47 In western Ukraine, the argument of forcible incorporation also applies 
to the period of 1939-45, although Ukrainian nationalists, unlike their Baltic counterparts, 
do not view the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact as illegal because it produced the desirable 
unification of most Ukrainian lands. However, unlike the arguments based on indigenous 
rights or the need for cultural renewal, the idea of delegitimizing the whole period of 
Soviet rule has little public support. This makes Ukraine unlike the Baltic states, where 
the refusal of Western powers to accept the legality of Soviet occupation was 
psychologically important for the general process of national consolidation.  
Nevertheless, one can argue that Ukrainian nationalists, even the mainstream 
Ukrainian national-democrats, use many of the same core concepts as their Estonian and 
Latvian counterparts, including the rights of indigenes versus in-migrants, the privileged 
status of a single national homeland, and discrimination in favor of a near-extinct 
language and culture.48 On the other hand, as noted above, most Ukrainian nationalists 
support the idea of a civic state. There is an obvious contradiction in the nationalist 
discourse when the emphasis on the formal civic framework of the state is laid alongside 
the idea of homeland and special rights for indigenous people. The latter undoubtedly  
 
                                                 
46 Detailed information available from the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity web site 
(http://www.europeanforum.net/news/310), accessed 20 January 2007.  
47 Wilson, 153. 
48 Wilson, 153. 
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estranges not only Ukraine’s ethnic minorities, but also many Russophone Ukrainians, 
which explains why Ukrainization has remained a sensitive issue despite the careful 
approach of Ukrainian authorities.  
The nationalist agenda on Ukraine’s external affairs is quite straightforward. 
Their main idea is that Ukraine is an organic part of Europe and European civilization, 
unnaturally separated from it by centuries of Russian rule. Russia, on the other hand, has 
always been an Asiatic, despotically-expansionist and imperialist state which throughout 
the history has attempted to deny Ukraine’s self-determination, and moreover, to destroy 
Ukraine’s very existence.49 Consequently, according to the nationalist view, Ukraine’s 
primary foreign policy tasks should be to secure a “return to Europe” and build a strong 
independent state free from harmful Russian influence.  
In contrast with Poland and the Baltic States, Ukraine cannot use these principles 
as the basis of a stable foreign policy. Unlike Latvia or Estonia, Ukraine’s economic 
policy unfortunately has not provided favorable conditions for enfranchising its huge 
Russian community. The Russian community, along with a substantial number of ethnic 
Ukrainians, does not share the nationalist vision, and sees Ukraine and Russia linked by a 
history of mutual interchange as much as by colonial dependency.50  
For most Ukrainian nationalists, the CIS, created in December 1991 by the former 
regional communist party leaders, is a stumbling block in Ukraine’s way back to Europe. 
Nationalists have pressed for Ukraine’s rapid integration into Europe’s overlapping 
political, economic and security architecture (OSCE, EU, NATO, Council of Europe, 
etc.). However, as more realistic nationalists acknowledge, admission into core European 
institutions is neither an easy task nor an immediate possibility. Ukrainian nationalists 
may see Ukraine as a indivisible part of civilized Europe, but its very long separation 
from European affairs means that Ukraine is not often perceived as a natural partner in 
European institutions, where realpolitik will probably dictate the preservation of the 
                                                 
49 Wilson, 173. 
50 Dmitrii Kornilov, “Tak kto zhe bol’she lubit Ukrainu?” Donetskii kriazh, no. 3, 21-7 January 2006 
(http://www.donkr.ukr-info.net) accessed 10 December 2006. 
 29
traditional special relationship with Moscow.51 Moreover, recent turns in Russian foreign 
policy under Putin’s administration, characterized by increased emphasis on political use 
of oil and natural gas, solidifies the dependency of key European players like Germany 
and France on Russian energy resources. 
Ukraine occupies an uneasy position at the crossroad of the East, the Russian 
Federation desperately trying to expand its influence, and the West, the European Union 
with its own spectrum of problems. Nationalist solutions to foreign policy dilemmas are 
to a large extent impractical and unrealistic. Ukraine has no easy escape routes from its 
external difficulties. As Russia is likely to remain a hegemonic regional power, its 
attitude toward near abroad will not change, and as a result, Ukrainian nationalists are 
likely to continue to push their agenda.   
F. RELIGION AND SELF-IDENTIFICATION 
Since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the new state authorities have never 
abandoned the idea of a united and truly national church. This is clearly illustrated by the 
most recent government decision regarding religious affairs, which in November 2006 
established the State Committee on Matters of Nationalities and Religions.52  
The way relationships between the state and the church are supposed to be is 
stipulated by Article 35 of the Ukrainian constitution, which shows fairly clear secular 
principles and a lack of state interest in siding with any specific church or involvement 
with intra-Church disputes. According to the Constitution, “everyone has a right to 
freedom of personal philosophy or religion…the Church and religious organizations in 
Ukraine are separated from the state, and the school – from the Church. No religion shall 
be recognized by the state as mandatory.”53   
 
                                                 
51 Kornilov. 
52 The authorization is Regulation 1575 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, referring to the 
reorganized State Committee on Matters of Nationalities. See the Religious Information Service of Ukraine 
at the  official website (http://www.risu.org.ua) accessed 27 January 2007. 
53 Ukrainian Constitution.  
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However, state authorities and the most influential religious functionaries, 
including Filaret, Patriarch of Kyiv and of all Rus’-Ukraine, constantly emphasize the 
necessity of a united national church to advance the nation’s spiritual consolidation. As 
Filaret said at a recent All-Ukrainian International Christian Assembly in Kyiv,    
the process of state-building in Ukraine has lacked the necessary spiritual 
foundation, that is one United Ukrainian Orthodox Church…the 
development of Ukrainian society needs to have two mutually supportive 
elements: an independent state and independent Church…is it really 
necessary to separate the Church from the state and the school from the 
Church so unconditionally, or should the law give some kind of priority to 
the traditional Church?54 
One might argue that this is not a bad idea, as a single faith is naturally quite a 
strong unifying factor for believers. However, considering the obvious divisions between 
traditional faiths in different regions of Ukraine (discussed below), giving state support to 
a particular church would probably not help preserve Ukraine’s fragile social peace.  
To see how strong religious affiliation affects self-identification, the thesis now 
describes Ukraine’s main religious jurisdictions.  
According to the Religious Information Service of Ukraine, more than 97 percent 
of registered religious communities are Christian.55 About half are in the Orthodox 
tradition. The other half is divided among Catholics and Protestants. There are three 
major Orthodox jurisdictions in Ukraine:  
• Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) 
• Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP) 
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There are also three Catholic churches represented in Ukraine:  
• Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) 
• Roman Catholic Church (RCC) 
• Armenian Catholic Church (ACC) 
The two biggest jurisdictions are UOC-MP and UOC-KP (9049 communities and 
2781 communities, respectively). There has been an ongoing dispute in Ukraine 
regarding religious legitimacy between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow 
Patriarchate, created in 1990 as a “self-governed” off-shoot of a Russian Orthodox 
Church which is still canonically subject to the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church-Kyivan Patriarchate, created in 1992, which was encouraged by some 
civil authorities, members of parliament and nationalist political parties. Since October 
1995, Filaret has been the head of this church, with the title Patriarch of Kyiv and all 
Rus-Ukraine. The UOC-KP does not presently have official recognition from Orthodox 
Churches in other countries and so is considered “not canonical.”56  
Ukrainian historian Viacheslav Lypynskyi in the early 1990’s wrote that “the fate 
of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is not tied to directing all its energies to an outward, 
generally materialistic ‘Ukrainization,’ but rather it is tied to a great internal, spiritual 
religious revival.”57 This still seems applicable. In the beginning of the 1990’s, most 
newly independent churches could not compete with the UOC-MP in the context of the 
old church model; this model had crystallized in Soviet times as a much worse copy of 
the Orthodox synod model. It is easy to track the actual dynamics by looking at some 
figures. A few years ago, the UOC-MP had 9047 communities, compared to the 3796 of 
the other two independent churches combined—that is 2.4 times as many communities. 
In 2000 the number of UOC-MP communities increased by 557, the UOC-KP by 290, 
and the UAOC by 26.58 
                                                 
56 Religious Information Service of Ukraine. 
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58 Religious Information Service of Ukraine. 
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Despite these figures, which show a seeming advantage to the UOC-MP, a 
paradoxical trend is obvious. Multiple opinion polls on church membership conducted by 
various think tanks and non-profit organizations in 2006 show that a greater number of 
those polled belong to the UOC-KP than to the UOC-MP. Various sociological services 
have carried out research on this topic. They find that between 25 and 32 percent of 
respondents belong to the UOC-KP; from 7 to 21 percent belong to the UOC-MP; from 
one-half to 2 percent belong to the UAOC. Most of those surveyed who claimed UPC-
MP membership are ethnic Russians. Those who belong to UPC-KP, UAOC or UGCC 
are ethnic Ukrainians or Ukrainophones.  
The survey results can be only interpreted in one way. By declaring membership 
in the Kyivan and not the Moscow Patriarchate, a person declares his or her identity, and 
that identity has a Ukrainian vector. In the vast majority of cases, therefore, these are  
obviously nominal Christians, “non-practicing,” and sometimes “non-believing 
Orthodox.”59 
Gretchen Knudson Gee provides interesting insights on religious issues in 
Ukraine. She personally conducted a survey of a great number of Ukrainian young 
people. Her data indicate that the regional location and a nationality of young people are 
very likely to affect their religiosity and their choice of religion.60 Indeed, western 
Ukraine is much more religious, and loyalty to the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian 
ethnicity are both associated with religiosity there. Eastern Ukraine is much less 
religious, and those who are religious are strongly associated with the UOC-MP.  
Therefore, for Ukrainian youth and for older generations as well, religious issues 
are linked to the political debates dividing Ukraine, and existing religious divisions may 
contribute to cleavages between supporters of a pro-western and nationalist agenda and 
those who advocate the Eurasian vector of national development.  
                                                 
59 Data from various recent opinion polls provided by Religious Information Service of Ukraine. 
60 Gretchen Knudson Gee. “Geography, Nationality, and Religion in Ukraine: A Research Note.” 
Journal for Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 34, no. 3 (September 1995), 383-390.  
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Ukraine today has among the most democratic laws on state-church relations; 
Ukrainian citizens are totally free in their choice of religious affiliations. On the other 
hand, the existing situation is very far from a religious consensus. The continuous efforts 
of Ukrainian political elites and some influential religious jurisdictions to create a 
national church have been unsuccessful and have deepened the social divide. Therefore, 
there is a little hope that religion, which has undoubtedly contributed to individual 
identity in Ukraine, will become a means of national consolidation any time soon.  
G. PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL CULTURE IN UKRAINE 
Political culture usually refers to national traditions of governance. In the case of 
Ukraine it is difficult to apply that definition since through most of its history the country 
was governed from outside. The question is what should be the basis for analysis: local 
self-administration, or the methods used by the indigenous elite when dealing with 
external powers?  
Focusing only on the state or quasi-state existence of the nation, there are four  
major periods in the Ukrainian history: the Cossack Hetmanate from 1654 until 1775; the 
nationalist governments between 1917 and 1920; the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 
within the Soviet Union and finally, the contemporary Ukrainian state. This focus allows 
consideration of the degree of “stateness” in analyzing the four periods. These state-
formations have not included participation of all parts of the nation. For example, the 
nationally conscious Galicia, though now eager to appropriate the traditions of the 
Ukrainian Cossacks, actually never hosted a Cossack movement of its own. Likewise, the 
memories of Soviet Ukrainian quasi-statehood apparently meaningful for the eastern and 
southern Ukrainian regions such Donbass and Crimea are less welcomed by western 
Ukrainians.  Different parts of Ukraine experienced different and sometimes mutually 
exclusive political and cultural traditions through the centuries.61   
Any new or re-emerged state has an obvious advantage if it can claim a domestic 
political tradition to build upon. In Ukraine there is a severe deficit of such traditions. 
More than one hundred years of Cossack Hetmanate were marked by the hetmans’ 
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unstable authority. Their power was increasingly supplanted by the Russian imperial 
government and constantly and sometimes successfully challenged by other external 
powers.  
The more recent tradition of the nationalist governments in Ukraine, including the 
Central Rada, initially did not go beyond securing some autonomy within a larger 
Russian Federation. According to the Rada’s Third Universal, autonomous-federalist 
arrangements were accepted as a model for national development, although this option 
was later rejected by nationalists led by the prominent Ukrainian historian and politician 
Mykhailo Hrushevskyi.  Hrushevskyi aimed toward full independence after the Bolshevik 
government's unfortunate “experiments” in Petrograd, and played very important role in 
forming a distinctive and sovereign Ukrainian political tradition.62 As head of the short-
lived Ukrainian People’s Republic, he attempted to expand the Central Rada, which 
represented solely ethnic Ukrainians, to unite other ethnic and national groups under a 
common banner. The precedents in parliamentary democracy and the appreciation of 
national independence established under the UNR were never completely forgotten in the 
Soviet period, even though the independent UNR was quickly overrun by the more 
powerful Bolshevik Russia in 1918.   
The Soviet regime which established a Ukrainian quasi-state within its totalitarian 
socialist empire obviously had nothing to do with democratic principles of self-
government. The Ukrainian political elite throughout the whole Soviet period until the 
breakup of the Soviet Union was a puppet sub-regime built upon the political culture of 
accommodation and passivity. The grim experience of catastrophic events like massive 
Stalinist repressions in the 1930s, the Great Famine and World War II all left their sad 
footprints in developing a “survival” consciousness among the Ukrainian people and their 
political elite. Ukrainians often turned against one another, as some actively resisted the 
Soviet westward advance while others were part and parcel of that advance.63 The 
seventy long years of Soviet rule, with the Kremlin policies of intense Russification and 
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promotion of the socialist way of life, deepened the gap between eastern and southern 
Ukraine, dominated by Russian culture and language, and the ethno-nationalist western 
part of the region. The post-Soviet period can be simply characterized as a period of a 
long transformation without a consistent political course or clear strategy to develop the 
state and society.  
A period of transition by definition leads to a crisis of identity in the society, 
which might be exacerbated if there is no common political culture. The depth and 
duration of the crisis largely depends on the ability of the political elite to accomplish two 
tasks. First, they must propose a course of development acceptable for the society and so 
set value-based coordinates for the formation of its new identity. Second, they must 
steadily keep up the chosen course, ensure stability and provide for social mobilization.  
So far in Ukraine, there are no value-based coordinates. After 15 years of 
independence, the country waivers between Western and Eastern vectors of development 
in terms of geopolitical integration and prevailing civic values. There is still no developed 
national tradition of governance in Ukraine which can establish a more or less predictable 
future for the country acceptable to all social strata. This assessment is confirmed by the 
views of Ukraine’s ordinary citizens. The most reliable general public opinion polls show 
that people tend to describe Ukraine as “an uninfluential European country looking for its 
place in the world.” In December 2005, this description was chosen by a majority (65.5 
percent) across the country, including 61.7 percent in the eastern Ukraine and 69.1 
percent in its western part.64 The polls also show significant alienation of Ukrainian 
citizens from the state which obviously damages the important link between ordinary 
citizens and the governing political elite. It is possible to conclude from the survey results 
that elected authorities in Ukraine tend to break from their electorate as soon as they 
obtain high government positions; once in power, the principle of democratic 
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representation simply loses force. According to a poll in July 2006, the overwhelming 
majority of citizens (75.9 percent) gave a negative response to the question: “Do you feel 
yourself to be a master of your state?”  In contrast, 16.4 percent feel that they are, and 7.8 
percent found it “difficult to say.”65   
An important element of political culture in any country is the institutional and 
legal relationship between central and regional authorities. According to some expert 
assessments, due to the ineffectiveness of the central authorities, an ultra-conservative 
model of local self-government was formed in Ukraine, rather than a conservative-liberal 
one as required by the European Charter of Local Self-Government ratified by Ukraine in 
1997. One might argue that this demonstrates that a mix of political and legal cultures 
(radical populist, oligarchic and traditional bureaucratic) dominate in society and among 
the political elite.66 As a result, heads of local authorities gradually transformed into true 
owners of municipal facilities. This led to the establishment and regional domination of 
financial-industrial groups (FIGs). These successfully lobby for their own interests and 
are represented in local and central state bodies through the “pocket” political parties in 
governmental offices. The FIGs described below are among the most economically 
powerful and politically influential.   
Donetsk business group (DBG), has an annual turnover of several billion US 
dollars. It consists of several corporations and operates mostly in Donetsk Region in the 
southeastern Ukraine, where 10.4 percent of the nation's population produces about 20 
percent of its industrial output. The main shareholders are the MP Rinat Akhmetov, who 
is a founder of the oligarchic “Party of Regions,” and Andriy Kluev, current Vice Premier 
Minister. Both backed the party financially and supported its official leaders, like Viktor 
Yanukovich during the 2004 and 2006 election campaigns.    
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“Industrialnyi Souz Donbassa” (ISD), has an annual turnover of about 1.7 billion 
US dollars. The main shareholder of ISD is the company “Visavi,” owned by the 
President of ISD, Sergey Taruta, and Vitaliy Gayduk, current Secretary of Ukraine’s 
National Security and Defense Council. 
Dnipropetrovs’k business groups “Interpipe” and the “Privat” Group are 
monopolists in their respective fields. The former has a monopoly on production of large-
diameter pipes used by the Russian oil and gas industry; it is headed by MP Viktor 
Pinchuk, who owns 65 percent of the company. The latter produces 45 percent of 
ferroalloy in Ukraine and owns 100 percent of Ukraine’s manganese resources.67 
As this demonstrates, the eastern and central regions of Ukraine are more 
developed economically than the western regions. Also, they are more autonomous 
economically, since their economy is based on export-oriented enterprises with more 
involvement in world trade and more developed ties to foreign partners. The data 
demonstrates the unequal economic development of different regions. In 2005, the per 
capita export potential of the country’s West equaled $281. In the East, the same figure is 
4.6 times higher ($1,295). Real incomes of the population in the central and eastern 
regions exceed the corresponding indices in the Western and Southern regions of Ukraine 
by 1.2 to 1.3 times.68  
This situation also obtains in regard to regional economic specialization 
(industrial East and South, mainly agro-industrial Center and West) and there are weak 
cooperative ties between the regions. 
In Ukraine, the domestic factors discussed above promote geographic localization 
of regional differences, and therefore different perceptions of political culture in the 
eastern and western regions. To reiterate, the specific domestic factors influencing 
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geographic localization and, indirectly, perception of political culture include the 
following: mutual incorporation of large businesses with regional and central bodies of 
power, disproportionate regional economic development, underdeveloped economic ties 
between the regions, and lack of effective state policy of to provide equitable regional 
development. All this makes national consolidation extremely complicated.  
D’Anieri points out that for Ukraine today, the process of nation building is 
tightly bound up with state building. Many argue that a strong democratic state cannot be 
built without a strong political community, which requires a nascent political culture, and 
that a strong civil society cannot be built without the notion of commonality that national 
identity builds. Others say that a strong nation can emerge in the near term only through 
the nation building that results from a strong and effective state government.69 Although 
opinion varies on just how serious these problems are and how they might be overcome, 
there is no doubt that creating a common national identity has been a profound problem 
in Ukrainian politics since 1991. The problem shows up in the fragmentation of political 
parties, in the regional basis of the party structure and of public support, and in questions 
concerning the relationship between central and local authorities. 
To comprehend the whole spectrum of existing factors which contribute to or 
retard national consolidation and the formation of a common identity, it is important to 
investigate major external influences, the subject of Chapter III.   
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III. BALANCING BETWEEN EAST AND WEST 
A. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS 
The geographic location of Ukraine is unique in that it both literally and 
figuratively lies at the crossroads between former Soviet bloc countries and Russia. The 
former are now democratic, and more or less economically developed members of the 
European Union; the latter insistently attempts to extend and solidify geopolitical 
influence beyond its western borders and regain its superpower status.  
With independence, Ukraine inherited a complex set of issues. First it had to 
define a path to development while legitimizing itself as an independent state on the 
domestic level among own, extremely diverse population and within the world 
community.  Second, it had to establish a model of governance to satisfy already existing 
nationalistic political forces as well as the old Communist Party political nomenklatura 
supported by a large Soviet-minded layer of Ukrainian society. The Communist Party 
leadership remained virtually in power by default, representing remnants of a quasi-state 
left behind by the Soviet Union. Then they suddenly changed their colors to become 
democrats; they started establishing democratic government institutions to provide a 
gradual transition from an authoritarian regime dependent on Moscow with a completely 
ineffective centrally planned economy, to the effective democratic state model with a 
market-oriented economy.  
The next step, which overlaps with the state building stage, is the recreation of 
Ukraine as a modern European nation. This turned out to be a difficult task for the first 
generation of political leaders led by then-former Communist ideology boss (and future 
president) Leonid Kravchuk. The task has not become easier for their successors. Ukraine 
has experienced 15 years of desperate attempts to develop efficient state domestic and 
foreign policies which would win support from the political elite and the general 
population while advancing key national interests in the international arena. A further 
challenge is to define those key interests in a constantly changing and complex 
international political and security environment.  
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The situation Ukraine inherited from the Soviet Union was clearly more complex 
and less amenable to rapid reform than its western neighbors’ circumstances. Whereas 
some states in Eastern Europe, like Poland and Hungary, needed both democratic and 
economic transitions, Ukraine had to undergo a “quadruple” transition that required state 
building and nation building in addition to democratization and the creation of a market 
economy.70 
B.  UKRAINE’S RUSSIAN DILEMMA AND THE SOVIET LEGACY 
1.  A Difficult Divorce? 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the relationship between Ukraine and 
the Russian Federation has been determined by several factors. The significance of these 
factors, particularly for the Ukrainian people’s self-concept, extends beyond the initial 
uneasy adjustment to the realities of a separate post-Soviet existence. One might argue 
that so far, neither Ukraine nor Russia has become fully independent during the 
democratic transition.71 Despite all Ukraine’s diligent distancing from the former Soviet 
state, Russia’s presence is still very much felt throughout the country, causing huge 
uncertainty about Ukraine’s national development.  
Since independence the problem of Ukrainian-Russian relations has been among 
the main preoccupations of the Ukrainian political establishment. On one hand, both 
Ukraine and Russia face uncertain prospects for their integrated economies.  On the other 
hand, 11.35 million ethnic Russians who found themselves in independent Ukraine and 
4.36 million Ukrainians left in Russia had been accustomed to what they believed was 
their larger common home, the USSR. Many of these people harbor reintegrationist 
sentiments that can be used to justify Russia’s intrusion in Ukrainian domestic affairs. 
Most importantly, Russian state officials, supported by state ideological activists, have 
equivocated on the issue of Ukrainian independence, giving the rise to the fear that 
Russia might even attempt to literally bring Ukraine back under its control.72  
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The goal of empire restoration was a pertinent feature of the course pursued by 
Russian political and military elites in the 1990s. That course was camouflaged by 
politicians and journalists who invoked the rights of “Russian speakers” in the area 
known as the near abroad as a justification for Moscow’s pressure or direct intervention. 
More candid commentators admitted that some people believe the only way to properly 
secure the rights of ethnic Russians outside the Russian Federation is to bring those 
newly independent republics back into empire.73  What seems paradoxical is that 
Russia’s attitude toward Ukraine should have triggered a natural resistance among the 
Ukrainian population, including the most easily influenced Eastern area. This logically 
should have galvanized social consolidation if only because of the widespread 
appreciation of independence (demonstrated by the 92.7 percent vote for independence in 
1991). Surprisingly, Russia’s continuing imperial ambitions in regard to Ukraine, 
especially during Boris Yeltsin’s presidency (1991-2000), have done little to create a 
sense of belonging, loyalty and distinctiveness from Russia. This can be explained by two 
factors: an extremely low level of attachment to any ethnic group at all, and the 
underdeveloped civic identity in the East.   
2.  Recent Russian Policy toward Ukraine 
Since 2000, under President Putin, Russian anti-Ukrainian sentiments have not 
been reduced, but their nature has changed. In hands of the current administration they 
became part of a more sophisticated strategy. Russia reassessed its approach to the issues 
of the Russian Diaspora to reassert Russia’s influence and ability to exert control within 
neighboring countries. In addition, a new hard-line policy emphasizing Ukraine’s 
dependency on Russian energy supplies, and widespread use of political technologies to 
spread secessionist and anti-Western sentiment in Eastern and South-Eastern Ukraine 
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regions, there is a uniquely underdeveloped sense of both ethnic and political belonging, 
whether to the Russian or Ukrainian nationality.74 This served as fertile ground for 
political speculations from outside.75  
3.  Political Technologists in Service to the Putin Administration 
The new generation of political thinkers has become involved in foreign policy 
making in Moscow. In the Kremlin, an environment dominated by ordinary apparatchiks, 
KGB-minded civilians, KGB-at-heart officers and ruthless business politicians with 
murky pasts, political technologists represent a new wave.76 Why should we take them 
seriously in the context of Ukraine’s identity issues? The use of political technologies is 
not new in the world of politics, but their potential for harm is worth discussing. 
Therefore, the answer to this question is simple: political technologies are a main source 
of new ideas about exerting Russian influence in the wake of its losses after the “color 
revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine.  
Political technologists like Gleb Pavlovsky, Sergei Markov and Modest Kolerov 
were appointed to the highest positions in a special department created by Putin to 
promote Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space. Their influence today is comparable 
only to that of the neo-conservatives on American policy after the 9/11 attacks.77  
Political technologists, with flourishing NGOs, think tanks, information agencies 
and media outlets, have inspired new policies aimed at mobilizing ethnic Russians and 
emphasizing Russia’s economic presence and potential as a labor market of last resort for 
the Eurasian societies. Stability and preservation of the territorial integrity of the post-
Soviet states are no longer the primary objectives of Moscow’s policies. On the contrary, 
the Russians are now exporting their own version of democracy and building pro-Russian 
constituencies in nearby areas, with particular emphasis on Ukraine. This process reveals 
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Russia’s attempt to counterbalance the sweeping force of globalization coming from the 
West. The Russian attempt is characterized by a significant role assigned to the Russia-
dominated NGO network which is supplied with ideologies and money from the state and 
“near-state” business circles. Their participation in the Russian policy-making process is 
heating up anti-Ukrainian sentiments in the border regions. However, there are some 
positive achievements of democratic consolidation in Ukraine, including the increased 
dependence of democratically elected state officials on their constituents. In response, the 
Russian ideological machine attempts to promote pro-Russian attitudes among ordinary 
Ukrainians at the expense of national consolidation, which obviously hampers the 
formation of a politically mature civil society.  
Today, the popularly elected Parliament represents a significant political force. 
Verkhovna Rada is controlled by the Party of Regions whose electoral platform was 
based mostly on a pro-Russian vector of national development. The radical left deputies 
even propound eventual re-union with Russia. It is crucial to understand how such 
attitudes can exist in Ukraine after 15 years of independent statehood. One answer lies in 
the ambivalence toward national consciousness of people in Eastern and Southern 
Ukraine and the state’s inability to achieve political consensus among ordinary citizens, 
political and business elites. This situation has been used by Russia’s political 
technologists to promote Russian-style pseudo-democratic values in Ukraine. They 
spread various myths of “eternal Slavic fraternity” and the impossibility of Ukraine 
existing without Russia and so on. Significant financial resources have been spent by 
Russia’s government to spread Russian-style democracy in the CIS through a network of 
NGOs. This “soft-line” campaign is supported by Putin’s hard-line energy policy, an 
economic weapon of last resort.   
Other influences from Ukraine’s long membership in the Soviet Union are also 
relevant, and will be examined further below. The question is this: why is it so difficult to 
eradicate the Soviet way of thinking and the mythical sense of belonging to something 
“big and powerful”? To illustrate one side of this phenomenon, the thesis now 
investigates some problems encountered by Ukrainian authorities while nationalizing part 
of the former Soviet military. 
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4.  Aspects of Ukrainian Defense Reform in Relation to National Identity 
The armed forces of any country that has embarked on the path of democratic 
transition represent the whole society. They are its mirror, but with one distinctive 
characteristic: a military organization cannot exist and function properly if its personnel 
(from the commander-in-chief to the lowest private) cultivate any allegiance other than to 
the nation. If the military serves not the whole nation, but only some fraction of it, and if 
ethnic or cultural divisions are encouraged or admitted in the military environment, the 
outcome can be frustrating and unpredictable. Recent troubles in Thailand and Fiji 
provide examples. The political elites of those countries obviously failed to reach a 
consensus in their populations on the necessity of serious defense sector reforms with 
functioning civilian control over the military organizations, instead giving priority to the 
development of the armed forces capabilities.  
Ukraine’s armed forces depend on their members’ political neutrality and 
undisputable loyalty to the entire nation or people, and not to the state alone.78 This is 
one reason why this ethnically and regionally diverse country has seen no escalating 
internal conflict. It is hard to even imagine what could have happened had the military 
machine that independent Ukraine found itself with in 1991 (780,000 personnel, 6,500 
battle tanks, 1,494 combat aircrafts and the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal) 
suddenly became a tool in ethnic or territorial conflict.79  
Military allegiance to “the people of Ukraine” instead of “the Ukrainian people” 
resulted from a long uneven process pursued by civilian and military authorities.80 Today 
the Ukrainian military still mirrors Ukrainian society in terms of self-perceptions and 
perceptions of the “other.” Compared to the rest of society, however, the military is much 
less divided. For this reason, it is relevant to consider policies aimed at strengthening the 
military’s sense of patriotism. 
                                                 
78 See the Law of Ukraine of 12/06/1991 № 1934-XII “On the Armed Forces of Ukraine” with 
amendments Available online: (http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?user=annot) accessed 5 
February 2007. 
79 For details see Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense official website (http://www.mil.gov.ua/) accessed 5 
February 2007. 
80 ‘The people of Ukraine’ is inclusive notion which refers to all citizens of Ukraine regardless of their 
ethnic belonging. ‘The Ukrainian people’ sounds more nationalistic and underlines ethnic belonging. 
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5. The Ukrainization of the Former Soviet Military 
Since the large military inherited by Ukraine was part and parcel of the former 
Soviet armed forces, it was considered a primary task for the state authorities in 1991 to 
transform this former Soviet military into a Ukrainian military whose servicemen would 
patriotically defend Ukraine. Consequently, a “Ukrainization” campaign was 
immediately launched. The effort to quickly instill Ukrainian patriotism in the armed 
forces was an important test of state-led nation-building efforts in general. The program 
envisaged several changes, including a switch from Russian (the only language of 
communication and instruction in the Soviet military environment) to Ukrainian. The 
most important aspect of the program was patriotic indoctrination of the troops using 
historical examples of Ukraine’s military traditions and heroes. The task of creating an 
all-encompassing patriotism based on historical examples seemed impossible. With the 
divisions in the Ukrainian population, the fact is that the more nationalistic Western 
Ukraine and more “slavocentric” Central, Eastern and Southern Ukraine took totally 
different people as heroes. 
The military’s Ukrainization program shows that the consequences of the nation’s 
ethnic, regional and linguistic divisions are difficult toovercome even with a forceful 
ideological campaign. Ukrainization initially alienated many non-Western Ukrainians, 
due to its glorification of anti-Soviet and anti-Russian military units like the SS Galician 
Division and Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN-
UPA), which fought against both German and Red Army troops in World War II. 
Western Ukrainians, for their part, were alienated by the continuous celebration and 
glorification of Soviet historical events and heroes , if only because the core of the armed 
forces was active duty officers who for many years were taught little but the glories of the 
Russian and Soviet Army traditions.  
One of the most active advocates of  patriotism among soldiers was Major 
General Volodymyr Muliava, then head of the Social Psychological Service (SPS) in the 
Ministry of Defense.81 In practice, the SPS succeeded its Soviet predecessor, the Main 
                                                 
81 Volodymyr Muliava, before his assignment to head the SPS, was a member of Rukh, the ultra right 
movement and later political party; he has a Ph.D. in Philosophy.  For details see D’Anieri and Kuzio, 148. 
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Political Administration (MPA), which had officers in all military units down to the 
company size as assistants in “political affairs.” The SPS and the MPA had basically the 
same task: to provide ideological support for unit commanders in their work with 
subordinates. The only distinction was that the MPA was a Communist Party propaganda 
machine and the SPS was called to instill nationalistic myths and “rally the servicemen 
around the ideal of an independent Ukrainian state, inculcating in them a consciousness 
of the historical development of Ukrainian independence … and a deep sense of respect 
and love for Ukraine, its people, culture, traditions and churches.”82 Under Muliava, the 
SPS espoused the Ukrainian “national idea.” In practice, the teaching of the “national-
liberation struggle” meant that SPS was to teach a purely nationalist version of Ukrainian 
history and glorify all prior anti-Soviet and anti-Russian military units. They created a 
legal basis for the program. Another influential public organization, the Union of 
Ukrainian Officers (UUO), even offered its own interpretation of section 11 of the Law 
on the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which states that “the military-patriotic education of 
military servicemen is to be realized using the national-historical traditions of the people 
of Ukraine.” The interpretation included the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists 
(OUN), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and the SS Galician Division.  
Naturally, attempts to glorify military units like SS Galician Division were met 
with hostility from large segments who grew up with Soviet characterization of that 
division as Nazi collaborators. By glorifying the Ukrainian “national liberation struggle” 
the SPS, with total support from Defense Minister General-Colonel Kostiantyn Morozov, 
accused Russians of having been the enemy and a negative “other.” However, in reality, 
Russians were never considered the enemy by most Ukrainians, and efforts to instill a 
particular notion of patriotism caused great dissension in Ukrainian military and political 
circles. The SPS’s Ukrainization program failed. Later, although the general idea of  an 
ideological apparatus within the armed forces was not abandoned, the approach to 
patriotic education changed and became more moderate in order to release tensions 
provoked by its previously ultra-nationalistic character.  
                                                 
82 Central military media outlet Narodna Armia, 22 January 1993 (http://uamedia.visti.net/army/) 
accessed 5 February 2007. 
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One reason for that transformation was the fact that until now there has been no 
common interpretation of particular events in Ukrainian history. Therefore, it would be 
better for the Ukrainian military, in terms of developing patriotism among the troops, to 
focus less on the apparently divisive eras in Ukraine’s history and more on individuals 
and periods that found general positive reception, like prominent leaders and military 
chieftains Boghdan Khmel’nits’kyi, Mikhail Kutuzov, Oleksandr Suvorov, and the 
warriors of the Kyivan Rus’ and Cossack periods. The history taught as part of the 
Ukrainization  program must be objective and truthful and based only on generally 
recognized facts. 
6.  The Soviet Past as an Obstacle to the Creation of a Common Identity 
The strength of the seventy-plus year heritage of Soviet rule on Ukraine’s national 
consciousness is revealed by some historical predicaments. The Soviet legacy touched 
every aspect of politics and society, and only a brief overview is possible here.  
The record of the Soviet government attitudes toward a distinctive Ukrainian 
national identity is mixed. The Soviet regime initially promoted Ukrainian identity and 
language in the 1920s and then ruthlessly suppressed both, but at the same time also 
established the territorial basis for the current Ukrainian state. Politically, the Soviet 
central authorities unconditionally forbade ethno-national sentiments, extinguished 
citizen-based initiatives that might have provided the beginnings of a civil society, and 
created a set of institutions, largely corrupted by the time the Soviet regime collapsed, 
that drove Ukrainian politics after independence and are still used by Ukrainian political 
elite.  
Any brief examination of Soviet nationality policies, especially if one focuses on 
some of the most brutal and repressive aspects, reveals that Soviet attitudes toward the 
republics had a clear nation-destroying effect. In fact, the Soviet legacy is somewhat 
more complicated and confused. Policies calculated to destroy nations in a direct, 
physical sense persisted throughout the Stalin era, and were succeed by policies of 
enforced linguistic and cultural de-nationalization when Khruschev and Brezhnev held 
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power.83 However, as D’Anieri notes, “Soviet nationality policy, despite its professed 
goal of subverting ethnic loyalties and destroying ethnic difficulties, promoted and 
accelerated the process of nation-building.”84 The Soviet Union disintegrated largely 
because Soviet nation-building failed. Ukrainians now have to deal with the residual 
loyalty to the Soviet empire deeply rooted in the consciousness of the older generation of 
Ukrainians, insufficient to sustain the Soviet state in the end, but nevertheless an obstacle 
to its replacement. Their pro-Soviet sentiments are supported by Ukrainian left radicals 
like the Progressive Socialist Party headed by Natalia Vitrenko. They relentlessly 
promote the idea of economic and political reintegration into something like a new Union 
State of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.85 It is hard to overestimate the harmful influence of 
such political forces on national consolidation in Ukraine. Psychological dependence on 
Russia is apparent among those who reject Ukraine’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic 
security system, and who resist by all means even the hypothetical possibility of 
integration into the European Union. There is no doubt that such openly anti-Western 
attitudes could not be sustained without Russian support, which insistently imposes its 
own style of democracy and human values in lieu of those accepted by the Ukrainian 
political elite and genuinely appreciated by the  Ukrainian public.  
It would be unfair to claim that the Soviets left only destructive tendencies for 
nation building. The Soviet heritage had some positive features. For example, Ukraine’s 
secession from the USSR was peaceful largely because there were defined boundaries of 
the Ukrainian SSR that became international borders. Soviet internal administrative 
borders therefore played a role in shaping the identities of the peoples within their 
respective republics, including Ukraine. This factor reduced the chances that Ukraine 
would start its independent existence with bloody interstate conflicts.  
 
                                                 
83 The proportion of Ukrainians listing Ukrainian as their native language in Soviet censuses declined 
from 93.5 percent in 1959 to 91.4 and 60 percent in 1970 and 1989, respectively. This was part of greater 
bilingualism, on the one hand, and greater Russian-language proficiency, on the other. See D’Anieri, 
Kravchuk and Kuzio. 
84 D’Anieri, Kravchuk and Kuzio. 
85 For details regarding their political platform, see official web site of the Progressive Socialist Party. 
(http://www.vitrenko.org/start.php?lang=1&part_id=3) accessed 2 February 2007.  
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C.  UKRAINE AND THE WEST 
1.  The Influence of Western Values on Ukraine’s National Development 
Foreign policy pursued by Kyiv in the early 1990s sought to bolster development 
of a Central European identity for Ukraine as a condition for its integration into European 
institutions. This policy stemmed from the image of Ukraine held mostly in the western 
part of the country, where national identity is at least as strong as it is in Poland, the 
Czech Republic or Hungary.86 Therefore, strong national consciousness in western 
Ukraine is linked to the positive influence of its geographical neighbors with their own 
distinctive national identities and their experience of the nation-state.  
The period from 1994 to 2004 in Ukraine saw a gradual decline of the taken-for-
granted pro-western vector of national development. Moreover, despite numerous 
rhetorical exercises  to convey a positive image of the West and the institutionalization of 
various practical multileveled relationships with it, partial rapprochement with Russia 
became a reality.  It is argued here that in contrast to authoritarian regimes, in 
democracies the main political course is tightly linked to, and should be based on, 
existing attitudes and preferences of the general public. Political elites cannot emerge 
from nowhere and impose their vision without support from the larger society. Therefore, 
this thesis considers that any government which represents all democratically designed 
branches of power is a product and direct reflection of the state of affairs in society itself. 
When a government obviously lacks a clear position on its course of national 
development and geopolitical orientation, it means that society as a whole lacks 
consensus. This explains the years of hesitation and lack of political clarity in Ukrainian 
politics. Of course, external foreign interests are relevant as well. As noted above, the 
Ukrainian government and the orientation of state policies focused mostly on the “back to 
Europe” thesis, which found significant support among the population.  
The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 increased openness and broadened 
appreciation for basic western values such as democratic governance, rule of law, liberal 
market economy and civil and political liberties. Because the former Soviet Union had no 
                                                 
86 Stephen Burant. Foreign Policy and National Identity. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47, No. 7, 
November 1995, 1126. 
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competitive alternatives to the Western principles of political, economic and cultural 
development, it was relatively easy for political leaders in the early 1990s to gain 
majority support and win temporary allegiance on the wave of euphoria that accompanied 
independence.  
Some changes in mass consciousness occurred when four years (1991-1994) of 
desperate attempts by official Kyiv to gain recognition and support from the Western 
world for nation-building in Ukraine did not bring the desired results. The subsequent 
problems centered around the inability of the governing establishment to carry out radical 
economic reforms to improve living standards. Here the word “radical” should be 
underlined, because the bright example of such “shock therapy” in neighboring Poland 
proved the only means to economic development in the long term.  
It is hard to name any democracy where the political leaders’ rhetoric always 
matches their practices, and it is very difficult to make the only right decisions or to find 
solutions which satisfy all strata of society. Sometimes, in order to achieve more it is 
necessary to undertake unpopular and painful reforms. The crucial thing is to be able to 
explain and convince society that they should sacrifice something now in order to get 
more in the future. Politicians naturally seem to feel that they know what is best for their 
country, but do not think that people would vote for the undistorted truth. Perhaps, 
especially in new Europe, successful democratic and national reform requires not only 
honest politicians but also an honest electorate, willing to admit that sometimes the only 
choice is between unpalatable options.  
Unfortunately, except during the short peaceful uprising of the Orange Revolution 
in 2004, the years since 1994 have been marked by unclear and inconsistent efforts by 
political elites to determine Ukraine’s future. Pro-Western President Yuschenko has 
taken steps toward democratic consolidation and progressive political change, advancing 
the idea that Ukraine should become a prosperous European country instead of remaining 
vulnerable to the depressing Eurasian influence with its murky prospects.  
How much Ukraine might draw to the European community depends on 
Yuschenko’s ability to implement a new stage in Ukraine’s relationship with the 
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European Union and to step closer to membership.  This seems a difficult task which will 
take longer than expected.87 Moreover, the administration’s effort to promote pluralism 
and the rule of law, necessary for a truly democratic state, at the same time fosters new 
elites whose views on political and economic transformation differ.  
The imperfect political reforms in 2006 exacerbated the current unclear 
distribution of powers between the president, the prime minister and the legislature.88 
Ukraine has become a parliamentary-presidential republic, and considering that the  right 
to determine state foreign and domestic policies is now no longer solely the presidents’ 
prerogative, the policy-making process has become extremely complicated. Additionally, 
the EU continues to question whether Ukrainian domestic developments are moving in 
the “right” direction. As long as the EU refuses to consider even a hypothetical 
possibility of Ukrainian membership, as Arkady Moshes notes, it “will be less interested 
in promoting Ukraine’s transformation, since successful reform would make the EU’s 
current wariness of Ukrainian membership less sustainable.”89  
During Kuchma’s presidency, despite his obviously pro-Russian orientation, a 
certain appreciation of the western model of development in political, economic and 
social spheres took root in Ukraine, as demonstrated by the numerous political and 
economic agreements he signed with the western powers. Especially noteworthy is that 
significant steps were made in building the national security system. Ukraine’s armed 
forces have established unusually tight ties with western security institutions within the 
Partnership for Peace Program, Intensified Dialogue, NATO-Ukraine Action and Targets 
Plans and various bilateral ties as well. However, Ukraine’s chances of full integration 
into Euro-Atlantic structures are questionable, given recent changes in the internal and  
 
                                                 
87 Volodymyr Dubovyk, “The Foreign Policy of Ukraine: One Year After the Orange Revolution,” 
Center for Strategic International Studies. PONARS Policy Memo No. 372, 2005), 30. 
(http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/pm/) accessed 5 February 2007. 
88 For detailed information on political reform in Ukraine see official website of the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine (http://www.kmu.gov.ua/ ) accessed 7 February 2007. 
89 See Arkady Moshes, “Ukraine Between a Multivector Foreign Policy and Euro-Atlantic 
Integration,” Center for Strategic International Studies. PONARS Policy Memo No. 426, 2006), 2 
(http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0426.pdf) accessed 5 February 2007. 
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external political climates. How reforms in the security sector relate to the general 
process of nation-building and creation of a national identity, along with the evolving 
perceptions of NATO, are considered next. 
2.  The Evolving Image of NATO  
The gradual adoption of a western model in national defense can be traced to 
Ukraine’s strengthening relationship with NATO.  There is already an organically 
developed understanding among the officer corps that Ukraine’s success requires, along 
with democratic civilian control, a professionalized military to upgrade defense 
efficiency and effectiveness.90 Of course, the achievements in the defense sphere in the 
West serve as an impetus to this approach, especially since the Cold War ended and new 
requirements for organization have appeared in the tremendously changed security 
environment. The way leading western powers quickly reassessed the roles and missions 
of their armed forces and built a new transatlantic security architecture while continuing 
to rely on NATO made a tremendous impression in Ukraine.  An obstacle to increased 
Ukrainian integration with Europe, Russian proximity, should be emphasized here, as 
Russia’s leaders have used this factor to exert influence on Ukraine. Among their most 
effective tactics is to spread anti-western images and speculation among those with  weak 
national consciousness in the less politically mobilized Eastern and Southern parts of 
Ukraine. Obvious harm has been done to Ukraine by this influence. A strategy of 
ideological and economic blackmailing has slowed the process of national consolidation 
in Ukraine. This confirms that the way a significant part of society collectively identifies 
itself in opposition to others is crucial in shaping the future of a democratic country. For 
sure, in countries with authoritarian regimes based on coercion, where public attitudes are 
seen as irrelevant by authorities, the situation is different.  
Returning to the question of military reform in Ukraine, considering the clearly 
insufficient financial and material resources for military needs, notions like “defense 
efficiency” and “military effectiveness” are of great importance. They have been 
                                                 
90 These terms originally introduced in the context of CMR by Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas 
in “Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations,” Naval 
Postgraduate School, National Security Affairs Department 
(http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5554) accessed 5 February 2007. 
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underlined in the major legislative acts and Ministry of Defense guideline documents. 
Only careful and efficient distribution of available resources will allow ongoing military 
reform.  
As to the general motivation for defense reform, Ukraine has a history of 
participation in many activities within the framework of the Partnership for Peace 
Program and various peacekeeping missions, and this is related to Ukraine’s 
understandable desire to join NATO.  NATO membership requires that Ukraine meet 
certain standards in terms of defense efficiency and military effectiveness. However, 
there is a common appreciation among the military that with or without NATO, the 
Ukrainian armed forces must be modernized and used appropriately. Given the complex 
international security environment with dramatically changed threat perceptions, 
including growing danger from global terrorism, only well-orchestrated international 
efforts and wise use of military forces can withstand danger. To a great degree this 
contributes to global trends in the military sphere, where common standards and 
perceptions are developing of what a modern military should be like if it is to effectively 
face emerging challenges. This underlines the necessity that Ukraine’s armed forces 
develop high interoperability on all levels with NATO forces and staff elements in order 
to act jointly if needed. Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas note that “counter-
terrorism operations may also provide an impetus for better military effectiveness, 
particularly in those countries that have been the targets of terrorist attacks.”91 Even 
though Ukraine has not experienced direct terrorist attacks, just the understanding that 
there can be no guarantee against them drives Ukrainian political and military officials to 
take the problem seriously and revise the general plans for strategic use of military force 
to recognize new challenges.  
Paradoxically, today’s military, unlike the general public, clearly understands 
which course of national development is most suitable for Ukraine.92 The military people 
                                                 
91 Bruneau and Trinkunas, 22. 
92 Data based on recently conducted polls by the most trusted Ukrainian think tank in all regions of the 
country shows that NATO is seen as an aggressive block by 70.7 percent of those in the East and 57.3 
percent in the South.  However, polls conducted by other Ukrainian institutes show no significant 
difference. 
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mostly recognize the advantages of integration into the Alliance as a first step to eventual 
integration in the EU, and believe that the whole society will benefit. They think so 
because integration requires progressive domestic changes which are important for 
Ukraine with or without final membership in NATO or the EU. The required changes 
include: 
• The necessity of effective liberal economic reforms 
• Increased transparency of the authorities on all levels of the executive, 
legislative and judicial powers  
• Effective anti-corruption measures 
• A general political consensus in civil society 
• Further maturing of democratic changes and guaranties that civic liberties 
and human rights will not be violated93 
But why do those seemingly acceptable and desirable social changes meet 
resistance in particular regions of Ukraine? There is a strong “fifth column” (discussed in 
earlier sections) eager to sow seeds of animosity between Russophones and 
Ukrainophones in order to deepen existing divergence in people’s self-identifications and 
prevent national consolidation in Ukraine.  
Through the lens of the relationship between Ukraine and NATO, continuity and 
a fairly deep level of institutionalization is evident. Some relevant milestones include:  
• Immediately upon gaining independence Ukraine joined the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (later replaced by EAPC) 
• In 1994 Ukraine became the first member state of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States to join the Partnership for Peace  
• Ukraine is active in NATO-led operations in the Balkans 
• In 1997 Ukraine’s President and NATO heads signed a Charter for 
Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine; a NATO- Ukraine 
Commission (NUC) was also created  
• In 2002 the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan was adopted which is the 
foundation of NATO-Ukraine relations  
                                                 
93 For details see the NATO official website (http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/index.html) 
accessed 7 January 2007. For details on development of the EU-Ukraine relationships, see the EU official 
website of (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ukraine/intro/index.htm) accessed 7 January 2007. 
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• In 2005 an Intensified Dialog on Ukraine’s aspirations to NATO 
membership was launched at the NUC meeting of foreign ministers in 
Vilnius  
These facts naturally suggest that civilian and military personnel   work 
continuously with the Alliance’s structures and can see the advantages of being 
associated with this powerful and highly developed security and defense organization. 
Their view of what the Ukrainian armed forces need in order to become more effective 
and efficient, along with their sense of the necessary changes at the national level, are 
formed mostly through interactions with various NATO subjects. Despite the remarkable 
improvements between official Kyiv and NATO member states, the next logical step, full 
membership in the Alliance, seems unrealistic, at least in the short term.  
Strong awareness of NATO—its roles, missions and activities—among the 
military suggests a corresponding acceptance of basic democratic values promoted by the 
West, one of whose embodiments in the eyes of Ukrainian people is the Alliance itself. 
Unfortunately, the lack of well-organized educational programs to objectively deliver to 
the bulk of Ukrainian society the truth about NATO is “generously” compensated for by 
well-organized ideological programs spreading anti-NATO ideas. An example is the 
campaign organized by Russian political and ideological functionaries and Ukrainian pro-
Russian politicians in Crimea in advance of NATO-Ukraine military exercises in 2006. 
The exercises were protested, attempts to declare the Crimea Peninsula as “a territory 
without NATO” were undertaken, and some separatist accords took place there. The 
situation finally calmed down, and in a fair decision by Ukrainian authorities, some 
Russian radical politicians who had implicitly roused the local Crimean population 
against legitimate authorities were deemed dangerous to national security and forbidden 
to enter Ukraine.94  
Leading powers of the European Union (NATO members) are reluctant to enlarge 
NATO eastward to include Ukraine, effectively mirroring and compounding Ukraine’s 
blurred prospect for EU membership. NATO officials offer various reasons, including the 
necessity to concentrate collective efforts and resources on the Global War on Terrorism 
                                                 
94 One of them is Konstantin Zatulin, a member of the Russian State Duma and Director of the 
Institute for CIS Countries. 
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and to focus on the Alliance’s internal problems related to the recent wave of 
enlargement.  Other reasons exist, like certain geo-strategic interests  connected to energy 
resources.  Here Russia plays a central role as an important provider of natural gas for 
Western Europe. Moreover, taking into account the dramatically increased scope of 
NATO tasks and recent tendencies in the Alliance to focus on energy security, there is an 
obvious link between Russia’s growing influence through its expansionist energy policy 
and Western European reluctance to bolster Ukraine’s integration into European political, 
economic and security space.  
3.  Consequences of the “Energy Game” for Ukraine 
Certain geo-strategic interests, particularly those pursued by Germany and France, 
play an important role in the geopolitical situation Ukraine confronts. Energy security in 
Western Europe today is an acute issue, especially since January 2006 when the Russians 
cut off natural gas to Ukraine (and, since major transit routes to Europe go through 
Ukraine, to  other consumer countries in the West). As a follow up, Russia dramatically 
raised the price of natural gas to Ukraine. Many saw this move as an effort to squeeze 
Ukraine politically and economically in order to secure Kyiv within Russia’s orbit, and 
this interpretation may well be true.95  
It is no secret that these countries rely on Russia for natural gas supplies which 
constitutes about a quarter of their total need. Realistically, it is natural that Germany or 
France would prioritize their own energy security and pay less attention to Russia’s 
increasing use of the energy leverage to influence Ukraine.  
A powerful deal in the energy sphere was concluded by Russian and German gas  
giants a year before the Russian gas cutoff. The so-called “Schroeder-Putin pact” came 
about on April 12, 2005, when leaders of both countries signed a “groundbreaking ‘Deal 
of the Century’ between two power giants – the German BASF and the Russian  
 
 
                                                 
95 See Paul Gallis, “NATO and Energy Security,” CRC Report for Congress, 21 March 2006. 
Available online (http://www.usembassy.at/en/download/pdf/nato_energy.pdf) accessed 10 February 2007. 
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Gazprom.”96 This memorandum of cooperation is groundbreaking for several reasons. 
For the first time in history, Putin’s administration allowed foreign experts to get 
involved with gas extraction in Siberia. Furthermore, the German leader agreed to the 
construction of a new North European pipeline at the bottom of the Baltic Sea, 
outflanking Germany’s partners in the EU and NATO. Those partners are Ukraine, 
Poland and the Baltic countries. The estimated cost of this project is about $8 billion.97  
Another powerful player in European energy market, Gaz de France, is the largest 
distributor of natural gas to Europe and is also heavily dependent on Russian energy 
supplies.98 According to the agreement signed in December 2006 between Gazprom and 
Gaz de France,  
[I]n return for access to Gaz de France’s pipelines, Gazprom agreed to 
extend its natural gas supply contracts, which were set to expire, to 2030, 
agreeing to sell 12 billion cubic meters a year to Gaz de France. In 
addition, Gaz de France will receive 2.5 billion cubic meters annually 
from the new Nord Stream pipeline, a joint Russian-German project in 
which Russia will be able to send natural gas directly to Europe by 
building a pipeline under the Baltic Sea.99 
Upon the completion of the Nord Stream pipeline project, given the very slight 
possibility that Ukraine will diversify its own energy sources by then, Ukraine will fall 
into the orbit of Russian geopolitical influence. Diversification of energy sources for 
Ukraine is complicated by the obvious reluctance of some European countries, for 
example Poland, to act on the commitment to complete the Odessa-Brody-Gdansk oil 
pipeline, which was to become the transit corridor for Caspian oil to Europe and an 
alternative to the Russian Druzhba pipeline which transports crude oil along the Black  
 
 
                                                 
96 See Simon Araloff, “Schroeder - Putin Pact: Germany and Russia Divide Europe Again.” Axis: 
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accessed 10 February 2007. 
97 See Araloff. 
98 The French state owns 80.2 percent of Gaz de France, so agreements between Russian state-owned 
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99 See Judy Dempsey, “Russian Company to Sell Natural Gas Directly to French Consumers: Russian 
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Sea. The Odessa-Brody-Gdansk project has great importance not only for Ukraine, but 
also for Poland, especially considering Russia’s decisive advance in the European energy 
markets.   
Here there is a parallel between Russia’s aggressive posture in energy and its 
official, traditionally negative attitude toward NATO and the EU enlargement. President 
Putin confirmed this at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in February 2007. 
Russia considers the prospect of Ukrainian membership in NATO and the EU a direct 
challenge to its geopolitical interests in Eastern Europe. Therefore, Moscow’s goal is to 
prevent NATO from playing a central security role in Europe, because Russia does not 
and will not have direct means of influencing its conduct.  In addition, it is 
understandable that Russia, under an administration like Putin’s, with its overblown 
imperial ambitions, will continue to use its energy leverage and all means available to 
hamper Ukraine’s rapprochement with the West.  
For these reasons, appreciation of the value of multidimensional integration with 
Europe is not growing in Ukrainian society. For example, recent public opinion polls 
show that as an option for the top priority in Ukraine’s foreign policy, a deepening of 
relations with Russia was chosen by 42 percent of those polled, versus 40 percent who 
support joining the EU.100  This situation, in turn, adds to the uncertainty in Ukraine. Will 
Ukraine find the necessary support from the West to withstand Russian influence or will 
it remain a stagnant buffer between the European Union and Eurasia?  
                                                 
100 Data provided by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies, July 2006. 
(http://www.uceps.org/) accessed 12 January 2007. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. THEORY AND PRACTICE  
Before constructing an analytical framework for studying the problems of national 
consolidation in Ukraine, it was quite challenging to find a plausible definition for a 
phenomenon such as national identity. This thesis argues that it is impossible to apply a 
purely primordialist or constructivist account to national identity in Ukraine. As 
discussed in Chapter II, the primordialist approach considers that nations are organically 
grown ethnogenetic entities which cannot be constructed or artificially created. In this 
view, the whole world is inevitably and fatally divided into nations. Premodern identities 
as products of historical ethnogenesis can be traced far back as ethnies or nations. In 
contrast, the major constructivist account suggests that nations are mostly modern 
artificial creations founded on myths of common historical origins and memories, and 
denigrates even the importance of ethnic roots. Moreover, it considers that belonging to 
an ethnic group is often a matter of attitudes and perceptions.  
The case of Ukraine clearly demonstrates that neither approach should be 
rejected, just as neither by itself is adequate for understanding the process of Ukrainian 
nation building.  
The contemporary notion of a Ukrainian nation represents a mix of a preserved 
distinctive ethnic identity, with some attachment to territory controlled by an ethnie, and 
a modern political entity produced by structural change under a particular discourse of 
domination, the project of elites and a bounded community of exclusion and opposition at 
the same time. The role of a distinctive Ukrainian ethnie which most Ukrainian 
nationalists would argue has ancient historical roots has proved insignificant to modern 
nation building.  
The research also shows that the process of a nation formation in Ukraine differs 
significantly from the process in most contemporary European countries, where modern 
nations were based on people’s sense of belonging to distinctive ethnic groups bounded  
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within historically-defined territories. In contrast, in Ukraine this stage of nation 
formation was heavily affected by outside influences, and the modern nation formation in 
Ukraine started much later.  
The explanatory models of a nation formation used in the research permit several 
generalizations.  
1) “National identity” and “nation” are complex phenomena composed of 
interrelated ethnic, territorial, cultural, economic and legal-political 
components.  
2) Nation is a concept which should be considered in two sets of dimensions: 
civic and territorial, and ethnic and genealogical. 
3) Nation as a sense of belonging can be interpreted as having evolved over 
time whether as an organic phenomenon or as an artificially created 
construction. Collective identity is not static but influenced by prevailing 
discursive processes. 
4) Historical memories strengthen the identity of the nation only if they are 
based on events that have actually taken place or on relevant historical 
myths accepted by a majority of society. 
5) Territory is vital to national belonging; the specific geographical position 
of the territory with its historical legacy and surrounding powers is 
important in defining national identity. 
B. UKRAINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY  
Having analyzed the theoretical approaches to national identity, another goal  of 
this thesis is to discover and use the most relevant tools for understanding the current 
weak sense of common national identity in Ukraine. Ukraine, with all the attributes 
necessary for independent statehood, nonetheless remains in a state of limbo with an 
unclear future. Therefore nation building should be considered the most important 
national project, given that Ukraine has no clearly dominant ethnic group which 
historically consolidated the nation and also lacks historical experience as a nation-state.   
Another goal of the thesis is to show the dependence of variables like national 
identity on a multitude of factors which influence its unique creation. The thesis, in 
addition, considers why an undeveloped sense of national identity hinders the general 
process of national development.  
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Ukraine embarked on a democratic development path 15 years ago and declared a 
commitment to democratic governance, popular sovereignty, political unity and a market 
economy.  However, the pace of transition has been slow compared with other countries 
due to specific factors described in the thesis.  
The most important factors, identified as the independent variables in the 
analytical framework, are the following: Ukraine’s unique geographic location, the 
historical absence of national statehood, and contemporary differences in cultural, 
linguistic, religious and geopolitical affiliations of the populations in different regions of 
Ukraine. As discussed in detail in the thesis, the combination of these factors proved to 
be the reason for uncertainty among Ukrainian society and political elites about the future 
of national development in Ukraine.  
The thesis also describes the results of recent sociological surveys that clarify the 
sense of Ukrainian citizens’ identity. The research confirms serious regional differences 
in that domain, including evidence of specific regional identities and manifestations of 
mutual estrangement between residents of different regions. Relevant poll results can be 
found in the Appendix. The survey research also makes it possible to conclude that the 
only basis on which Ukrainian national identity can be formed is an active civil society 
that does not place emphasis on ethnic distinctiveness or the superiority of one ethnic 
group over others. So far, no common civic identity has formed in Ukraine. However, 
empirical evidence suggests that the chance for a positive change remains.  
The current state of affairs in Ukraine hinders national consolidation, democratic 
development, and the construction of civil society, and therefore of a state governed by 
the rule of law. It may create serious risks for social solidarity, the integrity of Ukrainian 
society and even state sovereignty. The historical rifts between socio-cultural, 
geopolitical and religious affiliations are now difficult to transcend, in large part because 




The first factor is a powerful ideological campaign throughout the media 
conducted by Kremlin ideologists and Russian pseudo-historians. Its apparent goal is to 
sow seeds of animosity between the Russian-speakers in the East and South, on one hand, 
and those in the nationally conscious Western part of Ukraine, on the other, in order to 
expand and preserve Russia’s geopolitical influence.  
A second, still influential factor is the connections felt by the older generations to 
the Soviet past, which explains the low level of national consciousness and social 
mobilization. This factor is a direct ramification of the 70 years of Soviet ideology as 
well as contemporary Ukrainian authorities’ failure to provide economic and political 
stability in the country.  
As highlighted in Chapter III, the third important factor is Western influence, 
which has given Ukraine a general understanding and appreciation of “Western values” 
like true democracy, liberal market economy, the rule of law, human rights, etc. 
However, this appreciation is incomplete. The Ukrainian people’s acceptance of those 
basic virtues, to whatever extent they do accept them, has no clear and steady support and  
no “maintenance,” so to speak.  Ukraine has a critical need for Western support, at least 
from the countries which are concerned with the direction of Ukraine’s development. In 
order to illustrate Western attitudes, Western Europe energy policies are discussed, 
revealing that Ukraine finds itself deadlocked at the crossroads between major powers 
pursuing their own independent interests.  
The external influences considered in the thesis should be viewed as the major 
cause of the regional differences in the self-identification of the Ukrainian people. They 
are apparently echoed in socioeconomic, humanitarian, political and cultural subfactors, 
not only stabilizing the differences, but deepening them and transforming their 
inconsistencies into more serious contradictions.  
The traditional approach, which considers national identity as something given 
and static should therefore be rejected and indeed reversed. Only in offering practical 
solutions to the political, economic and cultural problems facing Ukraine and its people 
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can the modern national identity emerge. As the thesis demonstrates, in Ukraine the 
process of nation building is tightly intertwined with the process of state development. 
The continuing absence of a clear vision for Ukraine’s development, among both 
the political elite and mass society, hampers the formation of a common civic 
consciousness as well as the whole process of national development. At the same time, 
the lack of civic unity among ordinary citizens, which is essential for national identity, 
exacerbates existing divisions among political elites on the crucial, as yet unanswerable 
question: Will Ukraine become a “European” country, or will it fall into orbit around an 
increasingly authoritarian Russia by integrating into Eurasian space or joining an Eastern 
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APPENDIX.  PUBLIC OPINION POLL RESULTS 
This appendix contains results of public opinion polls conducted in 2005-2006 by 
the independent Olexandr Razumkov Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political 
Studies.  All tables were translated by the Center itself, which maintains an on-line 
website at http://www.uceps.org.   
The sociological surveys done on December 20-27, 2005, polled 2,009 
respondents aged 18 years or older in all regions of Ukraine; the sampling error does not 
exceed 2.3 percent.  Those conducted April 20-May 12, 2006 polled 11,216 respondents 
over 18 years in all regions; the sampling error does not exceed one percent.  
The regional division of Ukraine, reflected in the attached tables, is as follows:  
• West:  Volyn, Transcarpathian, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, 
and Chernivtsi  
• South: the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Mykolayiv, Odesa, and 
Kherson  
• Center: Kyiv city, Vinnytsya, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, 
Sumy, Khmelnytskiy,   Cherkasy, and Chernihiv  
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